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ABSTRACT OF THESIS 
KEEPING IT ALL TOGETHER: THE CHALLENGE OF  
COMPLEXITY, REPUTATION, AND SUPPLY CHAIN CRISES 
      Supply chains are developed to reduce business expenses and increase 
efficiency. However, a disruption in the supply chain, or a failure in one of the 
links, can expose organizations to crises that can severely impact short-term bottom 
line and long-term corporate reputation. This study examines the communication 
challenges inherent in supply chain crises using Samsung’s 2016 Galaxy Note 7 
phone crisis as a case study. Results of this study show, in a supply chain crisis, 
stakeholders hold the organization responsible, regardless of where in the supply 
chain the break occurred. This study also examines the impact of complexity 
inherent to supply chain crises and the challenges organizations face during a crisis 
when organizational reputation is impacted by links in the supply chain outside the 
organization’s direct control. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
Current business trends show growing reliance on supply chains to meet consumer 
demands (Natarajarathinam, Capar, & Narayanan, 2009). While supply chains reduce 
lead-time and inventory costs, they also open organizations to risk, as direct control is 
lost over product manufacturing and outcomes (Campi, 2013). Reliance on supply chains 
make businesses more vulnerable to crises and loss of revenue (Masullo, 2017; Powell, 
2011). A recent survey conducted with senior supply chain professionals found that over 
half of the business crises were directly linked to supply chain disruptions and were 
predicted to continually increase (Masullo, 2017). Powell (2011) found supply chain 
disruptions to be the most dangerous risk to an organization’s revenue drivers. The 
fragility of a supply chain is due to the already thin margin and schedule suppliers face - 
any delay or disruption has serious ramifications for organizations several steps down the 
chain, as well as the end users (Fisher, 2011; Manuj & Mentzer, 2008a; Manuj & 
Mentzer, 2008b). 
Managing supply chain risk is growing in importance as organizations recognize the 
interdependent nature of supply chain operations and the domino effect of one disruption 
in the supply chain (Faisal, 2009; Ritchie & Brindley, 2009; Zsidisin & Ritchie, 2009). 
Long supply chains, including global supply chains, further increase supply chain 
complexity and risk (Manuj & Mentzer, 2008a; Manuj & Sahin, 2008; Norrman & 
Jansson, 2004) and can limit organization flexibility in a crisis (Natarajarathinam et al., 
2009). Identifying exactly where product failure occurred in a complicated supply chain 
can be challenging and time consuming. 
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While supply chains are developed to reduce business expenses and increase 
efficiency, a disruption to that supply chain or a failure in one of the links can expose 
organizations to crises that can severely impact short-term bottom line and long-term 
corporate reputation. 
Organizational reputation, or the perception of the organization held by 
stakeholders, is a valuable resource that is threatened during a crisis (Coombs & 
Holladay, 2002; Seeger & Ulmer, 2001). Stakeholders are “any group or individual who 
can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organization’s objectives” (Freeman, 
1984, p. 46). Positive interactions lead to favorable reputations while negative 
interactions, such as a crisis, threaten positive reputation and can lead to unfavorable 
reputation (Coombs & Holladay, 2006; Davies, Chun, Da Silva & Roper, 2003; 
Dilenschneider, 2000). 
Due to the varying perceptions of responsibility by both the stakeholder and 
organization, crisis response strategies must be structured to seek understanding of both 
perceived and actual responsibility. Despite an organization’s level of control over the 
practices and timelines of suppliers, stakeholders will hold the organization selling the 
end product responsible for any product failings. Organizations must balance 
communicating to stakeholders regarding responsibility while determining the cause of 
the supply chain issue internally. 
The number of organizations with supply chains is steadily increasing 
(Natarajarathinam et al., 2009) and the differences in supply chain crises versus other 
organizational crises have not yet been examined in a communication context. Literature 
on supply chains originates mostly from business and management journals. Current 
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literature offers insight into proper management of supply chains (Blackhurst & Wu, 
2009; Powell, 2011; Slack, Brandon-Jones, & Johnston, 2013; Zsidisin & Ritchie, 2009; 
Zuckerman, 2002), risks inherent in the use of supply chains (Chapman, Christopher, 
Jüttner, Peck & Wilding, 2002; Liu & Wang, 2011; Ritchie & Brindley, 2009; 
Natarajarathinam et al., 2009), and other internal organizational objectives regarding 
supply chain management (Blackhurst & Wu, 2009; Gaudenzi & Borghesi, 2006; Ritchie 
& Brindley, 2009; Zuckerman, 2002) but fails to account for the external perception of an 
organization from a stakeholder perspective. Organizations utilizing supply chains and 
outsourcing control must be prepared to rationalize the stakeholder’s dissonance in the 
event of a crisis. Stakeholders will hold the organization responsible for supply chain 
crises regardless of the number of agencies involved within the supply chain. In 
managing reputation and crisis response, organizations must acknowledge stakeholder 
perceptions of responsibility, which may be at odds with actual responsibility. Supply 
chain crises are pertinent for crisis communicators to study because they uniquely 
challenge stakeholder attributions of responsibility during a crisis. 
Supply chain crises also uniquely challenge organizational reputation through 
complexity. With the rise of supply chain outsourcing, organizations now entail multiple 
entities, complicating the level of control an organization has over its end product as well 
as the stakeholder’s perception of what constitutes the organization. Where organizations 
once controlled all elements of production, agency is now more commonly externalized 
as organizations increasingly rely on supply chains for their products. While theorizations 
of reputation originally only relied, inclusively, on the organization’s own actions, recent 
crises have involved supply chain members constructing organizational reputation 
4 
(Coombs, 2006; Coombs & Holladay, 2002; Fombrun & van Riel, 2003; Newsom et al., 
2012). Winkleman (1999) states “For wherever the reputation goes, so goes the company- 
its profits, its stock price, its hold on the market, its hold on employees…” (p. 80). The 
organizational response must take into account the impacted organizational reputation in 
a complex and fragmented organizational makeup. Key to this complex environment is 
the increasing widespread distribution of labor (outsourcing) and, in effect, the 
distribution of control through increasing organizational members. Ultimately, utilization 
of a supply chain introduces complexity and shared accountability, increasing the 
challenge organizations face during crisis when reputation is dependent on members 
outside the organization’s direct control. 
The organizational response must take into account the impacted organizational 
reputation as a result of conflicting perception of organizational responsibility and control 
as organizations simultaneously manage at-fault suppliers while answering the 
stakeholders’ demand for an explanation of the crisis. The unique attributions of 
responsibility require an adapted approach to crisis response strategies. Hittle and 
Leonard (2011) call for further examination of supply chain crisis management to 
improve organizational functioning and stakeholder relations. This study answers that 
call by examining the communication challenges inherent in supply chain crises due to 
the dissonance of actual and perceived responsibility. 
To begin, literature regarding stakeholder perceptions of crises and the pursuit of 
identifying a responsible party is offered. In the next chapter, stakeholder theory and 
attribution theory support the idea that in a supply chain crisis, organizations must 
understand the varying stakeholder perspectives regarding the crisis, particularly 
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regarding attribution of responsibility and control. Situational crisis communication 
theory (SCCT), a potential crisis response framework for supply chain crises, is examined 
within the context of a supply chain crisis. The challenge of establishing organizational 
reputation when incorporating multiple entities within the organization is explored and 
reconciled with the tenets of SCCT. Finally, literature on supply chain and supply chain 
risk management is offered in order to contextualize the characteristics and risks 
associated with this type of organizational model, as well as offer insight into the 
challenges unique to a supply chain crisis. 
A notable and recent supply chain crisis, Samsung’s Galaxy Note 7 phone crisis, is 
examined to highlight the complexities inherent in this distinct crisis type and to study the 
organizational handlings of a past supply chain crisis, as well as media response. The 
study concludes by providing theoretical implications and outlining future research on 
supply chain crisis communication. 
Chapter Two: Theoretical Framework 
Stakeholder Perceptions of Crises 
Crisis communication research explores the role of communication before, during 
and after a crisis to better understand the impact of organizational response and 
engagement on the onset of and recovery from a crisis (Coffelt, Smith, Sollitto, & Payne, 
2010). Effective crisis management involves operational recovery or sustainment, 
minimizing stakeholder and organizational losses, and learning from past experiences 
(Miller & Horsley, 2009; Pearson & Clair, 1988). In times of crisis, an organization must 
respond to publics and understand that organizational crises create crises for individuals 
(Milburn, Schuler, & Waterman, 1983). Heath and Millar (2004) discuss the importance 
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of individual perception regarding crises stating, “each crisis has an actual dimension and 
a perceived dimension” (p. 6).  Interpretation and perception is the way that the 
individual is linked to the collective formation and actualization of crises: individual 
perceptions of publics are important to consider during a crisis from an organizational 
point of view. 
Stakeholder theory. Stakeholder theory supports this suggested importance of the 
individual, positing that in the midst of a crisis, organizations should not remain narrowly 
focused on stockholder’s needs, but rather consider the effects of the crisis on individual 
stakeholders (Freeman & Gilbert, 1987). For an organization to successfully manage a 
crisis, it must consider critical relationships to include stakeholders, or publics with an 
actual or perceived tie to the organization (Freeman & Gilbert, 1987; Ulmer, 2001). Such 
a perspective can “mean the difference between continued organizational successes and 
organizational failures” (Pearson & Clair, 1998, p. 71). 
Waymer and Heath (2007) suggest a greater focus on the “voices of the affected 
publics, those whose interests are part or most of the reason why the subject organization 
is suffering a crisis and in need of responding to public and media inquiry” (p. 88). 
Stakeholder theory offers this shifted focus, assigning all stakeholders intrinsic value and 
going against the conventional assumption of the shareholder model which places focus 
only on stakeholders that have a significant influence on shareholder value (Alpaslan, 
Green, & Mitroff, 2009; Laplume, Sonpar, & Litz, 2008). Crisis managers operating 
under this framework prioritize establishing mutually trusting and cooperative 
relationships with stakeholders, put in the effort to best understand how different 
stakeholders could be affected by and respond to a crisis, and are more cooperative in 
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attending to individual stakeholder interests during a crisis, past the point of legal or 
contractual obligation (Alpaslan et al., 2009; Jones, 1995). This approach is utilized for 
both strategic and moral reasons. Strategically, consideration of all stakeholders 
cognizant can lead to better crisis outcomes. Morally, a consideration of all stakeholders, 
not just those recognized as impactful to the bottom line, is a more ethically strong 
organizational practice. Alpaslan et al. (2009) propose crisis managers who utilize 
stakeholder theory over the shareholder model have more successful outcomes, such as 
faster crisis recovery time. 
Organizations facing supply chain crises could benefit from a stakeholder oriented 
perspective when deciding how to address the supply chain crisis and its skewed levels of 
responsibility. An understanding of stakeholder perceptions regarding the attribution of 
responsibility and control in the crisis is important to the creation of a successful crisis 
response. 
Attribution theory. Attribution theory helps us understand and anticipate how 
people cope with events based on the amount of responsibility people attribute to the 
individual or group responsible (Heider, 1958). Attribution theory is a useful framework 
for crisis management (Coombs, 1995). Heider (1958) offers that individuals are active in 
interpreting the interactions and events that occur and engage in logical and consistent 
processes of sensemaking when interpreting. The process of interpretation is done in 
order to both garner understanding, as well as establish control of the environment in 
which the individual exists. In the instance of an organizational crisis, impacted 
stakeholders are likely to engage in interpretation to make sense of the changing 
environment and determine at-fault parties (Coombs, 2007). 
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Heider (1958) developed attribution theory to examine the human tendency to 
attach meaning to individual behaviors both within oneself and others. When an 
individual deems a cause to their own or others’ behaviors, they determine an attribution 
(Littlejohn, Foss & Oetzel, 2017). Attribution is an internal process, of thinking, as well 
as an external process, of talking, to engage in interpretation and understanding of the 
roots of causality for individual behavior and other’s behavior. The perceived cause of 
the action in question can be attributed to that of dispositional or situational factors 
(Dainton & Zelley, 2015). Dispositional factors are unique to the individual and are 
relatively unchanging personal features such as personality or biological traits. 
Situational factors are those that can be applied to organizations in crisis. These factors 
are uncontrollable and established by the environment or specific circumstance, and are 
contextually driven (Heider, 1958; Dainton & Zelley, 2015). 
The process of attribution has been elaborated on to also include control, or whether 
or not we believe the party in question was able or unable to alter the cause of the action 
(Manusov & Spitzberg, 2008). Control attribution could occur when an organization 
faces a supply chain crisis and cannot meet stakeholder demands. The stakeholder 
engages in the process of attribution to determine whether the organization is facing the 
supply chain crisis because of a circumstance that was able to be altered, such as a lack of 
proper management of the supply chain, or lack of planning and preparing for supply 
chain incidents, or unable to be altered, such as a natural disaster shutting down elements 
of the supply chain. 
A focus on attribution of responsibility deviates from the perceiver seeking cause of 
an action and focuses more on the human desire to assign responsibility for the behavior 
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or outcome (Manusov & Spitzberg, 2008). Attributions of responsibility are important to 
studies of stakeholder sympathy in regard to corporate responsibility in crises. The more 
responsibility an organization is perceived to have in regard to the crisis the greater the 
negative stakeholder perception of the organization (Coombs, 2007; Manusov & 
Spitzberg, 2008). 
McAuley, Duncan, and Russell (1992) developed a measure of attribution of 
responsibility based on (1) isolated stability, if the individual or group is frequently 
involved in similar events; (2) external control, if outside sources or agents other than the 
individual or group involved had some responsibility for the event; and (3) locus/personal 
control, if the individual or group in question could have done something to prevent the 
event 
In a supply chain crisis, organizations should consider stakeholder attributions of 
both control and responsibility. The stakeholder’s perception regarding the level of 
organizational control over the supply chain crisis is more important for crisis response 
strategies than the actual level of organizational control. Stakeholder’s perceptions of 
organizational control will inform assessments of responsibility. 
Organizational reputation. Reputation is an important resource for organizations 
that affects publics’ behavioral intentions and attitudes toward the organization (Coombs 
& Holladay, 2002; Coombs & Holladay, 2006; Newsom, Turk & Kruckeberg, 2012; 
Seeger & Ulmer, 2001; Winkleman, 1999). An organization’s reputation is established by 
understood values developed between the organization and its stakeholders (Coombs & 
Holladay, 2006; Fombrun & van Riel, 2003; Newsom et al., 2012). Reputation is a result 
of “what [organizations] do, what [they] say and what others say about [them]” (Newsom 
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et al., 2012 p. 3). In other words, stakeholders form a reputation with organizations 
through direct interactions, mediated interactions (such as media reports and advertising), 
and word of mouth from other stakeholders (both in person and online) (Coombs, 2007). 
Reputation is “widely recognized as a valuable, intangible asset” (Coombs, 2007, p. 164) 
that can improve organizational standing. Coombs (2007) states “Most of the information 
stakeholders collect about organizations is derived from the news media,” which is why 
media reports are an important element of reputation management (p. 164). 
The complexity of supply chains can complicate organizational reputation, 
particularly at a time of crisis. Reputation is formed through “interactions and 
communication between organizations and stakeholders” (Coombs & Holladay, 2006, p. 
124; Fombrun & van Riel, 2003), but if an organization is not forthcoming regarding 
their reliance on a supply chain, stakeholders may not include suppliers in their 
perception of organizational reputation. In a supply chain crisis, however, suppliers are 
actively involved and impacting the organization’s reputation. Supply chain crises can 
further complicate reputation by introducing multiple organizational members that must 
be incorporated into the mutually understood values of the organization at a time of 
crisis. 
Current research has not yet fully developed impacts of complexity on 
organizational reputation; although stakeholders perceive organizations as singular, the 
realities of an increasingly outsourced world translate to theoretical inconsistencies for 
research and damaging consequences for organizations in crisis. Reliance on suppliers 
and outsourcing of labor introduces greater potential for skewed perceptions of 
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organizational reputation; in a supply chain crisis, organizations must answer as the sole 
responsible party for multiple entities’ actions impacting reputation. 
Barnett and Hoffman (2008) made a call for further research regarding reputation 
past the traditional definition of corporate action alone impacting reputation. They 
examined reputation in relation to other organizations under the notion of “the company 
you keep affects the company you keep,” asserting the actions of surrounding, unrelated 
organizations have an impact on the separate organization’s reputation (p. 1). Veil, 
Dillingham and Sloan (2016) had similar findings proposing a spillover crisis, or when 
“events in an external organization create concern, uncertainty, or perceptions of harm for 
another organization” (p. 317). In a spillover crisis, an unrelated organization potentially 
receives reputational damage, or negative spillover, due to a similar organization’s crisis. 
While both supply chain crises and spillover crises deal with stakeholder perception 
of organizational responsibility, it is important to note a key distinguishing factor 
between the two, the element of control. In a spillover crisis an organization is unable to 
control the happenings of an outside but related organization. A supply chain crisis, on 
the other hand, is directly related to the organization as a member of its supply chain has 
caused the crisis. 
Responding to crises that involve supply chains and multiple identities creating 
negative spillover complicates theory predicated on central organizational reputation and 
requires new considerations of crisis response strategies to account for the complexity. 
Crisis Response Strategy 
As a function of public relations, the purpose of crisis communication response is to 
prevent or lessen the negative outcomes of a crisis and primarily to protect the interests of 
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the organization at the heart of the crisis (Coombs, 2012). Responses include instructional 
information for physical protection, adjusting information to help stakeholders cope 
psychologically with the crisis, and reputation management responses to protect the 
reputation of the organization both during and following the crisis (Sturges, 1994). 
Instructing and adjusting information “represents what stakeholders need and want 
to know after a crisis hits” and are crucial elements of crisis management (Coombs, 2006, 
p. 246; Sturges, 1994). Instructional information describes what happened during the
crisis, or the crisis basics, and what, if anything, stakeholders must do to protect 
themselves. Adjusting information includes the actions the organization is taking to fix 
the problem and prevent the crisis from happening again (Coombs, 1999; Coombs, 2006; 
Sturges, 1994). While organizations may not have all the information regarding the crisis, 
what information the organization can offer should be given to stakeholders immediately 
following the crisis (Coombs, 2006). 
Coombs (1999) states instructing information can communicate organizational 
control during a crisis to stakeholders. If an organization presents information regarding 
the crisis basics, what stakeholders should do and how the organization is correcting the 
crisis, stakeholders perceive the organization as more in control. Whether or not an 
organization provides adequate instructing and adjusting information “also could affect 
the organization’s reputation” (Coombs, 1999, p. 127) either positively or negatively. 
Eisenberg (1984) argued for the use of strategically ambiguous communication 
within organizations to allow for differing, individual perspectives regarding 
organizational statements and values. Strategic ambiguity can also be used in crisis 
response (Coombs & Holladay, 1996; Ulmer & Sellnow, 1997). When used ethically and 
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effectively ambiguity can allow for multiple interpretations of the crisis if “through the 
exchange of complete and unbiased information, ambiguity enhances the stakeholders’ 
understanding of the situation’s complexity” (Ulmer & Sellnow, 1997, p. 229). 
Situational crisis communication theory. Following a crisis, organizations can 
engage in crisis response strategies to: frame attributions of the crisis, influence 
perceptions of the organization in crisis, and reduce the negative effects generated by the 
crisis (Coombs, 1995; Coombs, 2007). SCCT, grounded in attribution theory, offers a 
communication framework to best manage reputational affects of crises on an 
organization. SCCT requires analysis of organizational standing and the current crisis 
situation in order to predict likely stakeholder perceptions of the organization. Once 
perceptions of the organization, its stakeholder relations, and climate of crisis are clear, 
the best crisis response strategy to protect the organization’s reputation can be determined 
(Coombs, 2007). 
According to SCCT, individuals consider an organization’s crisis history, prior 
relational reputation, and initial crisis responsibility when attributing crisis responsibility 
to organizations (Coombs, 2007). Initial crisis responsibility “is a function of stakeholder 
attributions of personal control for the crisis by the organization” or how much 
stakeholders perceive the organization to have caused the crisis (Coombs, 1995; Coombs 
& Holladay, 2002, p. 166). The greater the level of responsibility attributed to the 
organization by stakeholders, the more damaging the crisis will be to organizational 
reputation (Coombs, 1995; Coombs, 2006). A poor prior relational reputation with the 
organization and/or a history of similar crises will intensify attributions of responsibility 
and further increase reputational threat (Coombs, 2007). 
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 SCCT identifies three crisis types (victim, accidental, intentional) and 
corresponding crisis response strategies (denial, diminish, rebuild). The response 
strategies are aligned with the crisis types based on the amount of responsibility 
attributed. The greater the attribution of responsibility in regards to the crisis, the greater 
the crisis response accommodation to stakeholders. 
Crisis type is assigned by how stakeholder perceptions are framing the crisis and is 
the first step in determining perceptions of crisis responsibility (Coombs, 2007; Coombs 
& Holladay, 2002). The framing of the crisis impacts the framing of the message, which 
“shapes how people define problems, causes of problems, attributions of responsibility, 
and solutions to problems” (Coombs, 2007, p. 167; Coombs, 2015; Cooper, 2002). The 
victim crisis type has very low attribution levels of responsibility such as a natural 
disaster or product tampering. Accidental crisis types have minimal levels of crisis 
responsibility and include such events as technical-error accident or technical-error 
product harm. In this crisis type, stakeholders perceive the event to be uncontrollable or 
unintentional by the organization (Coombs, 2007; Coombs, 2015). The intentional crisis 
type attributes the highest level of responsibility to the organization and includes human-
error accidents, human-error product harm, and organizational misdeeds. In this crisis 
framing, stakeholders perceive the crisis to be purposeful (Coombs, 2007; Coombs, 
2015). 
Crisis response strategies, or what the organization does and says following a crisis, 
“are used to repair the reputation, to reduce negative affect, and to prevent negative 
behavioral intentions” (Coombs, 2007, p. 170). Following a crisis, an organization must 
accept the appropriate level of responsibility for the crisis and answer for the crisis’ 
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impact on stakeholders. Organizations can deny, diminish, or rebuild for the primary 
crisis response strategy. The deny response is utilized when the organization either has no 
responsibility for the crisis or seeks to demonstrate no crisis exists (Coombs, 2006). The 
diminishing crisis response option acknowledges the existence of a crisis but argues the 
level of responsibility of the organization is lower than stakeholders believe. Utilizing a 
diminishing crisis response an organization can assume minimal responsibility or attempt 
to persuade stakeholders the crisis is not as severe as originally presumed. When 
assuming minimal responsibility, organizations express no intention to do harm or that 
there was no way to prevent the crisis. If organizations attempt to minimize the harm of 
the crisis, an explanation of why the crisis is less severe than stakeholders perceived it to 
be should be offered (Coombs, 2006; Coombs, 2015). In this response strategy, 
organizations seek to lessen the attributions of responsibility assigned by stakeholders. In 
the rebuild crisis response strategy, organizations assume full responsibility for the crisis 
and seek stakeholder forgiveness, sometimes offering compensation such as money, free 
products or other gifts (Coombs, 2006; Coombs 2007; Coombs, 2015). Bolstering 
strategies can also be used to supplement the primary response strategies in an attempt to 
further increase reputational assets. Bolstering, in a sense, seeks to generate goodwill 
amongst stakeholders and can be done through reminders of past organizational good 
works, praising stakeholders, and/or painting the organization as a victim in the crisis 
(Coombs, 2007; Coombs, 2015). 
Coombs (2006) states “An appropriate crisis response strategy matches the level of 
reputational damage generated by the crisis situation with the ‘protective powers’ of the 
crisis response strategies” (p. 245). These protective powers refer to the “ability to create 
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perceptions of the organization taking responsibility for the crisis and aiding victims” 
(Coombs, 2006, p. 255). In other words, if crisis response strategies are selected 
according to stakeholder perceptions of responsibility, the aligned response has the 
potential to positively impact the organization’s reputation and improve the crisis 
situation. Accordingly, organizations that select crisis response strategies that do not 
align with stakeholder assessments of control and responsibility will not benefit from the 
“protective powers” that would be offered by an aligned response strategy. 
While SCCT offers an effective framework to determine crisis response in order to 
impact stakeholder perceptions, the theory does not account for actual versus perceived 
levels of responsibility in crises where responsibility is obscured. Supply chain crises are 
generally not under the direct control of an organization, but if the organization does not 
attune to the unique stakeholder perceptions regarding the organization as the at-fault 
party, the correct crisis response strategy will not be selected. Organizations must utilize 
SCCT in conjunction with stakeholder theory to determine stakeholder perceptions of 
responsibility versus organizational assessments of responsibility. 
To better understand the communicative strategies needed in a supply chain crisis, a 
description of supply chains, and the unique characteristics of supply chain risk 
management is outlined next. 
Supply Chain Management 
Supply chains function to meet customer demand through an interconnected system 
of suppliers, production facilities, and related systems working toward production of a 
final product (Blackhorse & Wu, 2009; Stock & Boyer, 2009). Prioritizing efficiency, 
supply chains attempt to meet consumer demands while maintaining low inventory costs. 
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Supply chains are ultimately responsible for customer satisfaction and should involve all 
phases of design, procurement, manufacturing, and distribution (Sinha, Whitman & 
Malzahn, 2004). Gaudenzi and Borghesi (2006) suggest each member of the supply chain 
has unique approaches and goals but should be united under the common goal of the final 
market product and highest level of service for customers. Supply chain management 
serves to organize these motivations across the various organizations involved in order to 
establish efficient and satisfactory production for consumers. 
Supply chain management requires a mindset of collaboration to coordinate all 
entities involved in the supply chain in order for the supply chain to work as effectively 
and seamlessly as possible (Zuckerman, 2002). Blackhurst and Wu (2009) assert 
“Effective supply chain management is a crucial component of a firm’s ability to fill 
consumer demand, regardless of the industry” (p. 1). Zuckerman (2002) makes a similar 
claim stating “Companies today cannot ignore supply chain management and expect to 
survive. Nowadays, supply chain thinking is common operating practice for all major 
corporations worldwide” (p. 4). 
Slack et al. (2013) offer five performance objectives to evaluate a supply chains’ 
effectiveness in meeting both performance goals as well as customer satisfaction. Supply 
chains are evaluated on quality, speed, dependability, flexibility, and cost. Maintaining all 
performance objectives across the entirety of a supply chain is challenging for managers. 
With the interdependence of all suppliers, the supply chain is vulnerable to the varying 
constraints and fluctuations of all supply chain members (Slack et al., 2013). These 
concerns expose organizations to increased levels of risk as the level of control over the 
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final product decreases and the potential for breaks in the supply chain can lead to delays 
or halts on production (Powell, 2011; Slack et al., 2013). 
The importance of incorporating supply chain risk management alongside supply 
chain management is summarized well by Zsidisin and Ritchie (2009): 
[Supply chain management] today demands a much more proactive, strategic and 
corporate approach, engaging with the other organizations throughout the supply 
chain in seeking to gain sustainable competitive advantage and profitability through 
leaner, more agile, efficient, resilient, comprehensive and customer-focused 
strategies. Developments of this nature may not automatically reduce the risks and 
indeed may certainly change the profile of risks encountered if not increasing them 
(p. 2). 
Supply chain risk management. A universal definition of risk is difficult to offer 
as definitions of the concept vary depending on the academic and professional discipline 
in question (Ritchie & Brindley, 2009). Generally, risk can be defined as “the extent to 
which there is uncertainty about whether potentially significant and/or disappointing 
outcomes of decisions will be realized” (Sitkin & Pablo, 1992, p. 9).  Risks to supply 
chains can be divided into external and internal factors, with some researchers adding the 
factor of network relation to the categorization (Chapman et al., 2002). Examples of 
internal risk include production issues, structural defects, labor concerns, and IT-related 
incidents. External risks include political and legal influences, natural disasters, social 
factors and marketing risks. Network related risks are the interactions among the 
organizations involved in the supply chain (Chapman et al., 2002; Liu & Wang, 2011; 
Natarajarathinam et al., 2009). Each risk type has the potential to result in a supply chain 
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disruption, and potentially a supply chain crisis for which an organization must 
answer. With a variety of potential disruptions to the supply chain it is unsurprising that 
supply chains ranked as one of the top three business risk areas by 500 financial 
executives in both the United States and Europe (Ritchie & Brindley, 2009). 
Organizations utilizing supply chains face “increasingly uncertain demand as well 
as supply” making supply chain risk management a burgeoning area of management that 
is being implemented more frequently (Lee, 2008, p. 99; Zsidisin & Ritchie, 2009). 
Supply chain risk management takes a proactive approach to mitigating disruptions in the 
supply chain and is dependent on quality management to foresee potential disruptions and 
create plans to mitigate the negative impacts of a supply chain disruption when it occurs 
(Ritchie & Brindley, 2009). 
A global supply chain introduces further complexity with greater numbers of 
suppliers to manage and various international constraints. As Barry (2004) states, “The 
scope of supply chain sources and the markets are global; so is the risk” (p. 695). 
Researchers are looking specifically at global supply chain risk management to best 
assess risks unique to global supply chains (Manuj & Mentzer, 2008a; Manuj & Mentzer, 
2008b). 
The burgeoning field of supply chain management and risk management 
demonstrates the growing organizational recognition of the risks inherent with supply 
chains and the necessity for internal measures to manage these risks. Just as organizations 
have begun to realize the need for internal processes to prevent and mitigate supply chain 
risks, external measures must be put in place to respond when such risks are realized and 
result in supply chain disruptions and potential crises. 
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Research Questions 
Supply chain crises simultaneously distort attributions of responsibility while 
challenging perceptions of organizational reputation. The fundamental suggestion of 
SCCT— use crisis responsibility level to guide crisis response— is key to the acute 
paradox underlying supply chain crises. When suppliers are identified during a crisis, 
stakeholder notions of organizational reputation are complicated by the involvement of 
multiple organizations not before considered as part of the organization. Current crisis 
response strategy does not account for the reputational shift from a single to multiple 
identities and crisis response strategy literature fails to incorporate the perceived and 
actual level of responsibility an organization has over the crisis, as demonstrated through 
supply chain crises. As more diverse suppliers are incorporated into an organization’s 
function and appearance, response strategies must adapt to the increasing dissonance 
between responsibility and reputation. 
To demonstrate this unique crisis type, Samsung’s 2015 Galaxy Note 7 phone 
crisis will be examined. In August, 2016, Samsung released its Galaxy Note 7 
smartphone in an attempt to reach holiday markets and beat out competitor, Apple, for a 
new smartphone release during the profitable sales time (Brody, 2016). Less than one 
week after being placed on the market, reports regarding phones overheating and 
batteries exploding surfaced (Lee & Pak, 2016). The unpredictable nature of the 
exploding cell phones led the United States Federal Aviation Association and the United 
States Consumer Product Safety Commission to issue a ban on all Galaxy Note 7s from 
aircrafts and advisement for consumers to discontinue use of the phone (Dolcourt, 2017). 
Samsung issued a global recall for over 2.5 million phones and offered customers a 
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replacement phone. Samsung utilized a new supplier for the replacement cell phones; 
however, despite this new supplier, Samsung yet again faced reports of batteries 
overheating and exploding phones (Lee & Pak, 2016). After this, Samsung discontinued 
the production of the Galaxy Note 7 and advised consumers to stop using the device. 
Estimations show the company lost upwards of $5 billion due to this supply chain crisis 
(Brody, 2016; Dolcourt, 2017). To examine this case, the following research questions 
are posed: 
RQ1: What crisis response strategies did Samsung use during the supply chain 
crisis to communicate with publics? 
RQ2: What are the stakeholder attributions of responsibility during Samsung’s 
supply chain crisis as seen through media reports? 
RQ3: What are the organization’s attributions of responsibility during Samsung’s 
supply chain crisis as seen through organizational documents? 
RQ4: What challenges did Samsung experience during the supply chain crisis and 
resulting recall as evidenced by the organizational documents and media reports? 
Chapter Three: Methods 
The purpose of case study research is to develop the boundaries of contemporary 
phenomenon, cognizant to the larger context surrounding the process; as Yin (2002) 
observes, “The case study is the method of choice when the phenomenon under study is 
not readily distinguishable from its context” (p. 4). Case studies explicate the problem 
through observable mechanisms, including “a discussion of important elements, and 
finally, ‘lessons to be learned’” (Creswell, 1998, p. 221). Yin (1981) advocates a 
scholarly recognition of the narrative implicit to crisis events through qualitative and 
22 
critical research; case studies can “provide description, test theory, or generate theory” 
(Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 535). Case study research examines a broad range of historical, 
attitudinal, and behavioral issues and should be conducted in a comprehensive applied 
manner with the intent of translating the work into practical recommendations (Yin, 
2002). 
Data Collection 
Media reports and organizational documents from Samsung were collected to 
identify the crisis timeline, compose a crisis summary, and examine crisis communication 
strategies and attributions of responsibility in the case study. 
Media reports. A Google News Search with the search term “Samsung Galaxy 
note 7” and a date range of 08/01/2016, the month that the phones were released, until 
02/28/2018 to allow for the most current news coverage, returned 4,280,000 results. The 
search was then narrowed to “Samsung Galaxy note 7 supply chain” with a return of 
10,500 results. Many articles from the original search were included in the narrowed 
search term. Of the 10,500 “Samsung Galaxy note 7 supply chain” results, 50 unique 
articles were identified. The evidence in this case summary includes 36 news articles 
from the following sources: USA Today (n= 3), The New York Times (n= 8), National 
Public Radio (n= 2), Forbes (n= 4), The Wall Street Journal (n= 6), CNBC (n= 3), 
Fortune (n= 2), TIME (n= 1), Reuters (n= 3), NBC (n= 1), BBC (n= 1), and The 
Washington Post (n= 2) and 14 industry specific online magazines including CNET (n= 
5), Supply Chain 247 (n= 1), Supply Chain Dive (n= 3), Wired (n= 1), Slate (n= 1), The 
Verge (n= 2), Fast Company (n= 1), and Tech Radar (n=1). 
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Organizational documents. To obtain organizational documents, the search 
feature on Samsung’s website was used. The range of time from when the device was 
released, 08/01/2016, until the month the cause of the faulty phones was determined, 
01/30/2017, was searched with the term “Galaxy Note7” retrieving all organizational 
statements from Samsung during that time (n= 20). Samsung’s first organizational 
statement was on August 2, 2016 revealing the new smartphone and its features. The first 
statement acknowledging the overheating phones was on September 2, 2016, when the 
organization explained the product exchange program for consumers with faulty phones. 
A series of statements throughout September offered updates regarding the growing 
severity of the overheating and exploding phones. On September 15, 2016 the voluntary 
US recall was announced. By October 10, 2016 Samsung announced the Galaxy Note 7 
would not be sold in stores any longer. The organization released a final statement on 
January 22, 2017 offering an explanation as to why the phones were overheating. 
Data Analysis 
Before analysis, all documents were placed in chronological order to develop an 
understanding of the progression of the supply chain crisis. In order to best understand 
the details of the crisis, an initial overview of the data included reading each document 
and taking notes. Data was examined based on category of retrieval and within the 
category, in chronological order (for example, media reports were examined in the order 
they were released, then organizational documents in order of their release). 
Both inductive and deductive  analyses were used to examine the organizational 
documents and media reports. Although qualitative research often relies on inductive 
analysis, researchers advocate for a balanced approach to qualitative research using both 
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inductive and deductive processes (Hyde, 2000; Kirk & Miller, 1986; Parke, 1993). 
Relying only on inductive analysis “could deprive the research of useful theoretical 
perspectives and concepts” while relying only on deductive analysis “could preclude the 
researcher from developing new theory (Hyde, 2000, p. 88). Deductive analysis was used 
for the following research questions: 
RQ1: What crisis response strategies did Samsung use during the supply chain 
crisis to communicate with publics? 
RQ2: What are the stakeholder attributions of responsibility during Samsung’s 
supply chain crisis as seen through media reports? 
RQ3: What are the organization’s attributions of responsibility during Samsung’s 
supply chain crisis as seen through organizational documents? 
Analysis for RQ1 was guided by the crisis response framework SCCT (Coombs, 
1995; Coombs & Holladay, 2002; Coombs, 2006; Coombs, 2007; Coombs, 2015) in 
order to assess Samsung’s crisis response strategies during the crisis. Samsung’s 
organizational responses were found in the data and coded for qualities present in the 
SCCT response strategies. 
Analysis of RQ2 and RQ3 was guided by attribution theory (Heider, 1958) and 
measured according to Stratton’s (1997) attributional coding process. Each attributional 
statement was coded to ensure the statement met the standard dimension of attribution, or 
that the crisis was a result of an identifiable condition or event. 
 Inductive thematic analysis was used to analyze organizational documents and 
media reports to answer the following research question: 
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RQ4: What challenges did Samsung experience during the supply chain crisis and 
resulting recall as evidenced by the organizational documents and media reports? 
Clarke and Braun (2014) offer “a good [thematic analysis] involves more than 
simply reporting what is in the data; it involves telling an interpretive story about the data 
in relation to a research question” (p. 6626). Guest, MacQueen and Namey (2012) state 
thematic analysis can offer perspectives regarding not only the subjective human 
experience but also the “social and cultural phenomena as well” (p. 18). Both Clarke and 
Braun (2014) and Guest et al.’s (2012) assessments of potential benefits of thematic 
analysis support the application of the process in the current research. Assessing a past 
supply chain crisis through not only the organizational or stakeholder lens but the greater 
social and cultural lens as well can offer improved understanding of the unique 
challenges of a supply chain crisis. 
Steps to a successful thematic analysis range in number depending on the author 
but are similar in concept (Braun & Clarke, 2006; Guest et al., 2012; Chapman, Hadfield, 
& Chapman, 2015). Generally, the researcher must familiarize themselves with the data. 
Next, potential themes should be identified. After themes are identified, they should be 
reviewed, defined and named. Finally, conclusions should be drawn (Braun & Clarke, 
2006; Guest et al.; Chapman et al., 2015). Analysis was conducted similarly to the 
suggestions of Clarke and Braun (2014) and Braun and Clarke (2006). As suggested, 
research questions guided the analysis of the data while also allowing for new, 
unanticipated themes to emerge. 
The data was repeatedly examined in order to immerse the researcher in the data, 
through reading and rereading of the dataset and developing understanding of the context 
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of the data (Chapman et al., 2015). Both asides and commentaries were regularly taken as 
the data was examined. Asides, or succinct and clear reflections of the text and questions 
regarding the text, were written along the media reports and organizational documents 
(Lindlof & Taylor, 2011). Commentaries, or more elaborate asides dealing with broader 
issues, were taken on a separate page as organizational documents and media reports 
were reviewed (Lindlof & Taylor, 2011). As Lindlof and Taylor (2011) state, asides and 
commentaries are “jumping-off points for conceptual categories” (p. 244) based off what 
strikes the researcher as important or intriguing and are thus speculative. These 
comments help inform the next stage of the thematic analysis process, coding. 
Once the crisis was thoroughly reviewed, the research question guided the first 
round of analysis through open coding line by line (Lindlof & Taylor, 2011). In this 
phase, the data was coded for smaller pieces of potentially meaning information (Clarke 
& Braun, 2014). After the data was combed through initially for qualities present in the 
research questions, the data was again examined to allow for new insights not previously 
accounted for within the research questions. The constant-comparative method was used 
to “see more clearly how the categories are differentiated from each other, how they 
interrelate, and how full (or empty) of compelling evidence they are” (Lindlof & Taylor, 
2011, p. 251). 
After codes were established, a wider focus was placed on the data to identify 
pertinent themes across codes. Organizing the coded data by broader meaning offers 
insight into patterns across the dataset that are important to the research questions, as well 
as new insights not anticipated (Clarke & Braun, 2014). Triangulation, through analysis 
of various data types (in this research through the organizational documents and media 
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reports) was also used as the method “represents a comprehensive and accurate picture of 
the data” and improves validity of the findings (Chapman et al., 2015, p. 203; Lindlof & 
Taylor, 2011). 
Chapter Four: Analysis 
This study sought to better understand communication strategies used during a 
supply chain crisis, attribution of responsibility during a supply chain crisis, and 
communication challenges inherent to this unique type of crisis. By examining a recent 
supply chain crisis, Samsung’s Galaxy Note7 crisis, analysis of media reports and 
organizational documents offers insight into previously used crisis response strategies by 
an organization facing a supply chain crisis, as well as media attributions and 
organizational attributions of responsibility. This study allowed for new communication 
challenge themes to emerge to be explored in future research. 
Crisis Response Strategies 
In a crisis, an organization must answer for its actions by accepting responsibility 
and demonstrating accountability (Coombs, 2007). SCCT offers crisis response strategies 
as a way for organizations to accept responsibility in the eyes of its stakeholders. To 
assess Samsung’s crisis response strategies, organizational documents and media reports 
released during the time of the crisis were used to answer the following research 
question: 
RQ1: What communication strategies did Samsung use during the supply chain 
crisis to communicate with publics? 
Analysis was guided by the crisis response framework SCCT (Coombs, 1995; 
Coombs & Holladay, 2002; Coombs, 2006; Coombs, 2007; Coombs, 2015) to assess 
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strategies used by the organization during the crisis to communicate with its publics. 
Primary crisis response strategies should be chosen based on the level of acceptance of 
responsibility and include: deny, diminish, and rebuild (Coombs, 2006). Secondary 
response strategies, or bolstering, can be used to supplement the primary strategies. 
Samsung used all three primary strategies as well as the secondary strategy of 
bolstering. The use of response strategies shifted as the crises progressed. First, deny and 
diminish were used, assuming no responsibility or minimal responsibility. Rebuild 
strategies were used toward the end of the crisis, assuming responsibility and seeking 
forgiveness. Bolstering was used throughout. 
Deny. Initially, Samsung denied responsibility asserting “heating issues reported 
by Galaxy Note 7 users could have been caused by using different cables or adaptors than 
the ones supplied with the phone” (Valerio, 2016, para. 8) and placing blame on an 
isolated supplier who was no longer in use (Lee & Lee, 2016). Samsung’s denial 
strategies were found in media reports based on statements made by the organization, but 
were not found in the organizational documents online. 
Diminish. Samsung diminished the severity of the crisis in organizational 
documents. Statements minimizing the number of overheated and exploding devices such 
as: “While there have only been a small number of reported incidents” (Samsung, 2016a, 
para. 2) and “Although there have only been a small number of reported incidents” 
(Samsung, 2016d, para. 3) were included before explaining the steps the organization was 
taking to address the crisis. Emphasizing a low number of reported issues aligns with the 
diminish crisis response strategies as Samsung acknowledged the existence of a crisis but 
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argued the severity of the crisis was less than stakeholders may have perceived (Coombs, 
2006; Coombs, 2007; Coombs & Holladay, 2002). 
Rebuild. Rebuild crisis strategies were seen in both organizational documents and 
media reports once the recall was issued. Rebuild strategies include compensation, or 
offering crisis victims gifts or money, and apology, when the organization assumes full 
responsibility and asks for stakeholder forgiveness (Coombs, 2007). Compensation in the 
form of bill credit or a gift card was offered to customers under shifting conditions. First, 
$25 was offered if customers chose a Galaxy Note 7 family device when exchanging the 
phone (Samsung, 2016a) and then expanded to exchanges for any other Samsung product 
(Samsung, 2016d). Once the second recall was in place, compensation was increased to 
$100 bill credit “for a customer who exchanges a Note 7 for another Samsung 
smartphone” and $25 bill credit for those seeking a refund or purchasing another 
smartphone (Samsung, 2016j, para. 5). Apology was used after Samsung decided to stop 
production and sale of the Galaxy Note 7. The organization ran a full page ad in The New 
York Times, The Washington Post, and The Wall Street Journal stating “An important 
tenet of our mission is to offer best-in-class safety and quality. Recently, we fell short on 
this promise. For this we are truly sorry” (Samsung, 2016k, para 1). 
Bolstering. Finally, Samsung used bolstering strategies throughout the crisis in 
the organization documents. Bolstering is a strategy used to supplement the primary crisis 
response strategies and help repair organizational reputation by reminding customers of 
past good works and praising stakeholders for their patience and understanding (Coombs, 
2007). Samsung’s consistent pride in their brand and reminders of customer safety 
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prioritization were examples of bolstering as the organization reminded stakeholders of 
its positive traits in the midst of a crisis. 
Examples of Samsung’s bolstering include “Samsung continues to deliver the 
highest quality products” (Samsung, 2016b, para. 1), “Samsung has taken great care to 
provide affected consumers with the support they need” (Samsung, 2016d, para. 3), 
“Samsung is committed to producing the highest quality products” (Samsung, 2016d, 
para. 1), and “We thank the Department of Transportation, airlines, airports, our partners 
and Note 7 owners for their patience and support during this time” (Samsung, 2017a, 
para. 3). 
Samsung used all crisis response strategies, however, theory suggests crisis 
response strategies should be chosen based on the attribution of responsibility held by 
stakeholders toward organizations for the perceived control and responsibility in the 
crisis. In order to best assess the crisis response strategies used, attribution of 
responsibility must be understood. 
Attribution of Responsibility 
To understand the attributions of responsibility during the Galaxy Note 7 crisis 
and begin explicating the role of responsibility in a supply chain crisis that may differ 
from previous conceptions of clear-cut responsibility during a crisis, the following 
questions were posed: 
RQ2: What are the stakeholder attributions of responsibility during Samsung’s 
supply chain crisis as seen through media reports? 
RQ3: What are the organization’s attributions of responsibility during Samsung’s 
supply chain crisis as seen through organizational documents? 
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Analysis of RQ2 and RQ3 was guided by attribution theory (Heider, 1958) and 
Stratton’s (1997) attributional coding process. In coding, an attributional statement was 
one that “an outcome is indicated as having happened, or being present, because of some 
identified event or condition” (Stratton, 1997, p. 124). Attributional statements had to 
meet the dimensions of internal/ external and/ or controllable/ uncontrollable. Internal/ 
external dimension assesses if the cause originated within the organization or was an 
external circumstance. Controllable/ uncontrollable assesses if the organization could 
have exerted a significant amount of control over the crisis or the crisis was completely 
out of the organization’s control (Stratton, 1997). 
Stakeholder attributions of responsibility, as seen through media reports (RQ1) 
unanimously attributed Samsung as the at-fault party. Such attributions of responsibility 
include “Samsung is to blame” (Swartz, 2016, para. 9), “Samsung… did not do the type 
of quality assurance and testing to make sure the Galaxy Note 7 was designed properly 
and totally safe” (Sullivan, 2016, para. 9), “Procedures have been either lax or ignored, 
and the safety checks you would expect to be present did not catch the flawed design” 
(Spence, 2016, para. 13), “If it’s once, it could be taken as a mistake. But for Samsung, 
the same thing happened twice with the same model” (“Samsung permanently stops 
Galaxy Note 7 production,” 2016, para. 16), and “Samsung… did not do the type of 
quality assurance and testing to make sure the Galaxy Note 7 was designed properly and 
totally safe” (Sullivan, 2016, para. 9). All attributions held Samsung directly responsible 
with most speculating the organization rushed the production and pushed design 
capabilities in order to compete with Apple’s iPhone 7 release. USA Today reported an 
expert on lithium batteries said Samsung was at fault “for trying to create what he calls a 
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thinner ‘club sandwich’ – a layer of electrodes stacked in the phones battery – to give its 
devices a sleek design” (Swartz, 2016, para. 9) and an analyst with Bloomberg 
Intelligence stated “They were rushing to beat Apple and they made a mistake” (Spence, 
2016, para. 9). 
Samsung, on the other hand, did not attribute responsibility in any of the 
organizational documents (RQ3). The organization indirectly accepted responsibility 
following the recalls but did not attribute responsibility during the crisis. The acceptance 
of responsibility can be seen when President and COO Tim Baxter stated Samsung 
“appreciated the patience of our consumers, carrier and retail partners” and asserted 
Samsung was “committed to doing everything we can to make it right” (Samsung, 2016j, 
para. 4). At the press conference held in January, 2017 where the organization 
conclusively revealed the reason behind the overheating phones, President of Mobile 
Communications Business, DJ Koh “expressed his sincere apology and gratitude” but did 
not outright state Samsung was at-fault. 
As noted in media reports, however, Samsung originally attributed responsibility 
to forces outside of the organization’s control- consumers using incorrect charging 
equipment and a supplier no longer in use. EBN, an online community and reporting site 
for global supply chain professionals, and Supply Chain Dive, an industry news cite 
focused specifically on the supply chain industry, both report Samsung attributing the 
cause of the overheating phones as something that “could have been caused by using 
different cables or adaptors than the ones supplied with the phone” (Spieler, 2016; 
Valeria, 2016, para. 8). The New York Times reported on September 2, 2016, the day 
Samsung confirmed the first Galaxy Note 7 recall, that “Samsung said it thought the 
33 
problem came from a ‘minute flaw’ in the production of the batteries. Samsung would 
not name the supplier involved” (Mozur & Lee, 2016, para. 12). In contrast, Samsung’s 
organizational documents from the same day announcing the recall did not attribute 
responsibility and reference a supplier issue, instead stating the recall was a result of “a 
battery cell issue” (Samsung, 2016b, para.1) and “isolated battery cell issues” (Samsung, 
2016a, para. 1). 
While media reports demonstrate a clear attribution of responsibility, holding the 
organization at fault for the overheating phones, the organization did not have as clear of 
attribution. This lack of awareness of responsibility was demonstrated in the array of 
crisis response strategies Samsung employed. The difference in the number of 
attributional statements in media reports (n= 18) versus organizational documents (n= 0) 
further indicates Samsung did not prioritize establishment of a coherent attribution during 
the crisis. Interestingly, the only acceptance of responsibility by Samsung is done by 
statements to the media and the full page advertisement in major newspapers. The clarity 
with which Koh states “We now feel a painful responsibility for failing to test and 
confirm that there were problems in the design and manufacturing of batteries before we 
put the product out to the market” (Sang-Hun & Mozur, 2017, para. 9) at the 2017 press 
conference held to explain the cause of the overheating phones, assumes responsibility 
more than any organizational document. 
Samsung’s Supply Chain Crisis Challenges 
Thematic analysis of media reports and organizational documents was conducted 
to answer RQ4 (What challenges did Samsung experience during the supply chain crisis 
and resulting recall as evidenced by the organizational documents and media reports?). 
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Overarching themes of both supply chain systems challenges and communication 
challenges were identified. 
System challenges. Unsurprisingly, as the Galaxy Note 7 crisis was a direct result 
of a fault in the supply chain, the theme of supply chain challenges was prevalent in 
media documents. The theme was not, however, mentioned in Samsung’s organizational 
documents. Thus, a divide in organizational response and media priority was found in the 
inductive analysis as it was with the deductive analysis of attribution of responsibility. 
Media reports, such as The Wall Street Journal’s position, on the role of Samsung’s crisis 
in better understanding supply chain complexities were recurrent: 
Samsung Electronic Co.’s botched recall of its Galaxy Note 7 smartphone is 
putting a spotlight on supply-chain oversight and raising questions about the 
ability of today’s technology and management tools to help companies maintain 
quality control in giant complex networks of suppliers- as when products are 
being built and upgraded more swiftly (Loten & Norton, 2016, para. 1). 
The supply chain challenges that emerged in the analysis included: the difficulty of 
managing a supply chain even for large companies, increased risks in global supply 
chains, dangers of shared suppliers across an industry, and the affect of industry 
pressures. 
Strong chains still have gaps. The challenge of effectively managing a supply 
chain is articulated by the not one, but two supply chain crises Samsung, an organization 
known for its prowess in supply chain management, faced. The New York Times supports 
Samsung’s position of expertise in supply chain management commenting “the recall 
strikes at the heart of what has long been considered [Samsung’s] greatest strength: its 
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management of the supply chain” (Mozur & Lee, 2016, para. 28) and concludes the 
article stating “You wouldn’t think this would happen to a company like that, but 
somehow it slipped through” (para. 32). Suggestions for supply chain managers emerged 
in media reports during coverage of Samsung’s crisis. A call for greater supply chain 
visibility in order to catch issues in production before they result in crises (Spieler, 2016), 
improved supplier relationships with an emphasis on value from suppliers, as opposed to 
low cost, and quality control (Brody, 2016) were recommended based off of Samsung’s 
recalls. 
After the Galaxy Note 7 phones had been pulled from the market and ceased 
production, during the January 2017 press conference revealing the cause of the 
overheating phones, The New York Times noted the surprising occurrence of Samsung’s 
back-to-back supply chain crisis stating “the most interesting part of the presentation was 
what Samsung did not say: How could such a technologically advanced titan – a symbol 
of South Korea’s considerable industrial might – allow the problems to happen to begin 
with?” (Sang-Hun & Mozur, 2017, para. 2).  
Globalization of supply chains. Research shows global supply chains, while 
offering cheap labor and raw materials, are coupled with uncertainties and heightened 
risks (Barry, 2004; Manuj & Mentzer, 2008a; Manuj & Mentzer, 2008b). Valerio (2016) 
well summarizes globalization in today’s supply chain stating “Organizations are finding 
that the supply chain is infinitely more complex than it was twenty or thirty years ago” 
(para. 3). Timothy Brown, managing director at Georgia Institute of Technology’s Supply 
Chain & Logistics Institute, cautions that “companies looking to reduce costs by 
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outsourcing much of their supply chain to countries with cheaper labor markets also run 
the risk of sacrificing quality” (Loten & Norton, 2016, para. 9). 
Samsung’s supply chain crisis was further complicated and more difficult to 
manage due to reliance on a global supply chain. Comments regarding global supply 
chains remark on a system that is “very stressed” (Valerio, 2016, para. 3) with the 
potential for “low standards and few regulations” (Mozur & Lee, 2016, para. 27) 
particularly regarding smartphone batteries since the market is “full of counterfeits” 
(Valerio, 2016, para. 9). 
Samsung also met problems identifying the cause of the crisis during the first 
recall due to the lengthy and complex global supply chain (Loten et al., 2016). Media 
reports noticed the organization’s lack of clarity regarding the root of the issue and made 
comments such as “Samsung still doesn’t even know the source of the problem” 
(Sullivan, 2016, para. 2) and “Exactly what went wrong remains unclear” (Oremus, 2016, 
para. 3). Interestingly enough, the at-fault supplier for the first recall was eventually 
determined to be from Samsung’s own facility, Samsung SDI (Lee & Lee, 2016). This 
introduced a new concern for the crisis as Samsung SDI supplied lithium-ion batteries to 
many top electronic brands, including Apple (Lee & Lee, 2016; Spieler, 2016; Valerio, 
2016). 
Shared suppliers increase spillover risk. Until the exact issue was pinpointed, 
media reports questioned the safety of products containing Samsung SDI batteries. 
Samsung’s own facility was then placed under the microscope as speculations of safety 
of electronics other than Galaxy Note 7s caused concern for companies such as Apple 
that utilized the lithium-ion supplier (Lee & Lee, 2016; Spieler, 2016; Valerio, 2016). 
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When Samsung SDI was revealed to be the cause of the faulty batteries, Valerio (2016) 
speculated “this development could disrupt the supply chain for new devices for the rest 
of the year” (para. 2). While this element of the Galaxy Note 7 crisis did not impact 
Samsung Electronics, the risk of reliance on the same suppliers is important for 
understanding supply chain crises and potential risks of supply chain interdependence. 
Although not Apple’s crisis, the brand was mentioned in the media during the 
Galaxy Note 7 coverage. For example: “Samsung’s recall could affect more than just the 
South Korean company. Samsung SDI, the company’s battery maker also supplies 
batteries to various other companies including Apple” (Spieler, 2016, para. 1) and “The 
company… makes batteries for other phone-makers too, including Apple” (Lee & Lee, 
2016). Reliance on the same suppliers in the industry opens organizations up to the 
potential for a spillover crisis (Veil et al., 2016). Samsung faced a supply chain crisis as 
the Galaxy Note 7 contained faulty batteries from one member of the supply chain. Apple 
faced a potential spillover crisis as a result of sharing lithium battery suppliers with the 
perceived unsafe Samsung supplier. 
Reliance on the same supplier was not the only tie to Apple in the Galaxy Note 7 
crisis. Media reports commonly speculated that a major contributing factor to the faulty 
smartphone was rushed production by Samsung to beat Apple’s iPhone 7 release date and 
attempts to overextend the brand’s technological abilities to keep up with smartphone 
industry pressures. 
Industry pressures stretch capability.  In hopes to beat competitor Apple’s new 
iPhone release date, Samsung pressured suppliers to hurry production, and engineers to 
innovate quickly, to regain standing in smartphone sales (Oremus, 2016). This rush and 
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overextension of technological capability was mentioned often in media reports. 
Bloomberg News released a story with the title “Rush to Take Advantage of a Dull 
iPhone Started Samsung’s Battery Crisis” (Lee & Lee, 2016). Other stories seconded the 
sentiment. “It wasn’t meant to be this way” Forbes states, “The South Korean company 
brought forward this launch and the retail side of the Galaxy Note 7 by ten days this year, 
to early August. That offered it clear air before the iPhone 7 family would arrive” 
(Spence, 2016, para. 2). Multiple articles make similar claims such as “Samsung was 
counting on the Galaxy Note 7 to maintain momentum against Apple’s new iPhones” 
(“Samsung Galaxy Note 7 batteries reportedly catch fire”, 2016, para. 2), “The recall puts 
Samsung, which has been trying to match the success of the Apple iPhone, in a 
precarious position” (Mozur & Lee, 2016, para. 3), and “The Galaxy is one of the South 
Korean company’s most visible consumer product lines, and its smartphones compete 
with the Apple iPhone for pre-eminence with consumers” (Kang, 2016, para. 9). Industry 
pressures and competitive positioning that led to the rushed production “can’t come at the 
expense of quality control” (Brody, 2016, para. 1; Loten & Norton, 2016; Oremus, 2016) 
and yet, for Samsung, that was the case. 
Samsung is not alone in feeling the industry pressure to produce and innovate 
rapidly. While “Samsung in particular has developed a reputation for jamming as many 
features as possible into a single handset” (Oremus, 2016, para. 14), Oremus (2016) 
proposes other smartphone industry leaders absorb Samsung’s Galaxy Note 7 crisis as a 
cautionary tale: 
We might look back on Samsung’s battery meltdown as an inflection point in the 
history of the industry, when the frantic push for smartphone-makers to launch 
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‘revolutionary’ new devices every year or two finally ran up against the physical 
limits of the form (para. 16). 
The complications due to the organization’s complex supply chain and the various 
noted implications supply chain managers can take away from Samsung’s case may 
inform why the organization was not perceived as transparent or effective communicators 
during the crisis. 
Communication challenges. Subthemes related specifically to communication 
challenges were also found in Samsung’s organizational documents and the media 
reports. While balancing the interests and needs of all involved is undeniably difficult, 
Samsung did not effectively communicate during the crisis. Avi Greengart, an analyst at 
Current Analysis, a global market research firm, commented “They have not been very 
clear in their communications, in terms of what specifically is the problem, how it will be 
resolved and what’s the time frame” (Selyukh, 2016, para. 15). Specifically, themes 
emerged regarding transparency, ambiguous instruction, mixed messages, “unsafe” 
reputation, and consumer defiance. 
Lack of transparency. Media reports offered frustrated pleas to Samsung to clarify 
statements, proactively share information, and assume responsibility for the crisis. 
Commentary such as “they’ve under communicated, rather than over communicated” 
echoed sentiments commonly portrayed in media reports (Selyukh, 2016, para. 21). 
Sullivan (2016) stated “From the very beginning Samsung should have been more honest 
about the problem. It should have called the thing by its proper name- a product recall. 
Instead it called it an exchange program” (para. 12).  Oremus (2016) summarized this 
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frustration during the second recall stating “Samsung could recover more quickly if it can 
show transparency and accountability in its handling of the investigation” (para. 7). 
Ambiguous phrasing such as “exchange program” instead of global recall, the 
aforementioned minimizing of the number of faulty devices, terming the overheating 
phones as “incidents” (Samsung, 2016a; Samsung, 2016b; Samsung, 2016d; Samsung, 
2016i) and stating consumers “raised questions” during the second recall, as opposed to 
stating consumers experienced overheating and exploding devices (Samsung, 2016g), did 
not paint Samsung to be a transparent and open company during this crisis. 
The contrast between these vague terms and the online content circulating 
describing and even showing videos of phones not “just overheating or melting down or 
imploding – they were exploding like bombs” (Sullivan, 2016, para. 4) was stark. Media 
reports demanded transparency and ownership regarding the overheating and exploding 
phones. Following the second recall, Forbes questioned procedures in place, suggesting 
Samsung revisit decisions that led to the same issue happening twice (Spence, 2016). The 
article continued on to say “How the company reacted to the problem, how the recall was 
implemented, and how the issues were communicated to the world should be questioned” 
(Spence, 2016, para. 13). Forbes took issue with the communicative handlings of the 
crisis from the very beginning; the immediate reaction, the recall protocol, as well as the 
handlings of issues along the way, were not up to par (Spence, 2016). Quotes like these 
further strengthen the notion that the media framed Samsung as not effectively handle the 
crisis and that more transparency and communication would have improved perceptions 
of the organization. 
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The concept of multiple stakeholders could potentially inform Samsung’s lack of 
transparency regarding the Galaxy Note 7 crisis. Once a global recall was necessary, 
Samsung had to include suppliers, government agencies, retailers/distributors, and 
consumers in order to pull all unsafe devices from the market while also answering for 
why the crisis occurred in the first place. Involved government agencies included 
Consumer Product Safety Commission, Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation 
Administration, and International Air Transport Association (Selyukh, 2016; Spieler, 
2016; Swartz, 2016). Involved retailers/distributors included Verizon, AT&T, T-Mobile, 
and Sprint (Kang, 2016). The question was, did Samsung really know what was going on 
in order to offer stakeholders and media transparency? With the complexity of involved 
parties including suppliers, government agencies, and retailers, confusion was at an all-
time high as Samsung scrambled to determine the issue in what Koh described as “a tiny 
problem in the manufacturing process” (Selyukh, 2016, para. 5). 
Ambiguous instruction. While strategically ambiguous crisis responses can 
potentially be effective (Coombs & Holladay, 1996; Ulmer & Sellnow, 1997) Samsung’s 
use of ambiguity did not improve the crisis. Ulmer and Sellnow (1997) offer the use of 
ambiguity in crisis response when its use improves clarity regarding the crisis scenario. 
Samsung’s use of ambiguity in crisis response did not benefit stakeholders in 
interpretation of the crisis and offer improved clarity. Instead, the ambiguity reflected the 
confusion Samsung experienced regarding the crisis and negatively impacted the clarity 
of communication to stakeholders. Both organizational documents and media reports 
demonstrated this theme throughout the crisis. Samsung’s first statement addressing the 
faulty devices and announcing the temporary halt on sales advised customers who 
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purchased the Galaxy Note 7 that Samsung would “voluntarily replace their current 
device with a new one over the coming weeks” (Samsung, 2016b, para. 3). In this initial 
statement Samsung did not insist consumers replace the device and was not clear 
regarding the danger of the overheating phones. On that same day, in a separate 
statement, Samsung offered the “availability of the U.S. Product Exchange Program for 
Galaxy Note 7 owners” before mentioning there had “only been a small number of 
reported incidents” (Samsung, 2016a, para. 1-2). The word “availability” and the 
reminder of “a small number of reported incidents” does not necessarily stress whether or 
not the exchange is mandatory, suggested, or just an option. Samsung did not place 
urgency or concern on the announcements regarding the devices. In response to the 
reports that replacement devices that were supposed to be “safe” were having the same 
issues as the previous devices, Samsung responded by saying “If we conclude a safety 
issue exits, we will work with CPSC to take immediate steps to address the situation” 
offering stakeholders little direction regarding the safety of their new replacement 
devices (Samsung, 2016g, para. 4). 
Instructing information can communicate organizational control during a crisis to 
stakeholders and benefit the organization’s reputation (Coombs, 2006). However, the 
instructing information in the organizational documents on the various recalls 
demonstrated a lack of clarity. After the first recall was established, the organization 
released 8 statements that included instructions or details regarding how to participate in 
the recall (Samsung 2016a; Samsung, 2016b; Samsung, 2016c; Samsung, 2016d; 
Samsung, 2016e; Samsung, 2016f; Samsung, 2016h, Samsung, 2016j; Samsung, 2016L). 
Samsung had to repeatedly offer instructing information to consumers while waiting for 
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all unsafe devices to be returned. Each organizational statement was another reminder of 
the crisis the organization was facing. 
Mixed messages. Media reports reflect confusion regarding the recall protocol, 
timeline for a fix, how safe the replacement devices truly were, and the severity of the 
risk of using the device. From the first recall, The New York Times reported confusion 
stating “It was unclear if Samsung would provide refunds for the Galaxy Note 7 
customers who did not want a replacement by the company” (Kang, 2016, para. 10). 
Other media sources report consumers struggling to go through the recall process 
efficiently. NPR pointed to the “interchanging sales reps, bureaucratic intricacies and 
unclear guidelines” as one customer attempted to exchange her faulty device (Selyukh, 
2016, para. 2). The story went on to say “Alongside stories of completely smooth 
transactions floating on Twitter, Reddit and Samsung forums are posts about lengthy 
customer service calls, unnecessary store visits, demands of original boxes or accessories 
and other hiccups” (Selyukh, 2016, para. 14). What was already a crisis, the 
organization’s device overheating and exploding unpredictably, has now worsened as 
consumers struggled to efficiently return their devices. 
Just how severe the danger was of the device was also unclear. More than a week 
after recommending consumers power down the Galaxy Note 7s, a formal recall was still 
not issued and it was still legal to sell the devices (Selyukh, 2016). Lee and Lee (2016) 
also commented on the “mixed messages” Samsung sent, recommending phones should 
be shut off and not used, and days later stating a software fix had been created that 
prevented batteries from overheating. Similarly, many stakeholders felt confused and 
frustrated after the first global recall when after receiving what was supposed to be a 
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fixed device, turned out to have the same risk of overheating and exploding as the first 
Galaxy Note 7 (Oremus, 2016). BBC News well summarizes this frustration and 
confusion regarding reassurances of safety from Samsung when they rehash the timeline 
of the recalls in comparison to Samsung’s response: 
In September, Samsung recalled around 2.5 million phones after complaints of 
exploding batteries. It later insisted that all replaced devices were safe. However, 
that was followed by reports that those phones were catching fire too. A Kentucky 
man said he woke up to a bedroom full of smoke from a replaced Note 7, days 
after a domestic flight in the US was evacuated after a new device started emitting 
smoke in the cabin. Even as late as Monday evening, a spokeswoman insisted the 
phones were safe to use. But on Tuesday, the company said it would stop Galaxy 
Note 7 production (“Samsung permanently stops Galaxy Note 7 production”, 
2016, para. 8). 
Samsung’s lack of clarity regarding the crisis was evident to the publics as they 
demanded clearer communication from the organization. 
As noted, as the crisis progressed, Samsung did offer instructional information that 
sought to help with confusion and clarify what information the organization was able to 
clarify. These messages generally included updates via organizational documents 
regarding what the organization was doing to ensure the consumers were safe and the 
steps to participate in the recall with sources to go to if consumers needed further 
explanation. Bulleted lists of instructions regarding options for those needing to replace 
or exchange their devices were included at the end of statements (Samsung, 2016a; 
Samsung, 2016d; Samsung, 2016j). Samsung also stated it was using multiple mediums 
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of communication to reach a range of consumers who may not have heard about the 
exchange. These mediums included “direct communications, customer service, social 
media, marketing, and in-store communications” (Samsung, 2016j, para. 9). 
Another example of clarifying information came after the first recall, when 
consumers were encouraged to exchange the risky phones for the “safe” Galaxy Note 7s. 
At this time, many consumers were confused how to tell if their device was safe or not. In 
response, Samsung developed a software update which displayed a green battery icon to 
indicate “consumers have a new Galaxy Note 7 with an unaffected battery” (Samsung, 
2016e, para. 3). The organization also released informational videos and images once the 
cause of the battery overheating was discovered to assist stakeholders in understanding 
why phones were exploding. (Samsung, 2016e; Samsung, 2017b; Samsung, 2017c; 
Samsung, 2017d). 
“Unsafe” reputation. Another common theme throughout media reports was 
concern regarding Samsung’s reputation as a result of the crisis. Reaction to the first 
recall led Bloomberg Technology to report “This is creating an enormous problem for the 
company – for its reputation and ability to support customers when there’s a problem” 
(Lee & Lee, 2016). BBC News reported similar opinions following the second and final 
global recall stating “The real issue is brand and reputation… the fact that Samsung 
appeared to still be shipping defective devices could trigger a large loss of faith in 
Samsung products” (“Samsung permanently stops Galaxy Note 7 production”, 2016, 
para. 24). The New York Times put it most succinctly simply stating, “The Note 7 disaster 
raised more doubt about Samsung’s reputation.” (Sang-Hun, 2016, para. 17). Although 
the overheating and exploding device issue was directly linked to two separate supplier 
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faults, and not a design factor that Samsung was responsible for, the crisis still negatively 
impacted the organization’s reputation. Media reports took issue with a product as a 
representation of Samsung that endangered consumers, regardless of the supplier being 
at-fault. 
When phones began overheating and exploding on airplanes, the Federal Aviation 
Association, the International Air Transport Association, and The Department of 
Transportation’s involvement eventually led to the banning of Galaxy Note 7s from 
airplanes (Spieler, 2016; Sullivan, 2016, Swartz, 2016). The Department of 
Transportation stated the Samsung Galaxy Note 7 was “considered a forbidden hazardous 
material under the Federal Hazardous Material Regulations” and would not be allowed on 
any flights (Selyukh, 2016, para. 1). Signs were placed at airports reminding flyers that 
Samsung Galaxy Note 7 devices were not permitted on airplanes due to the explosive 
potential of the device. Samsung lost control as messages regarding their devices were 
placed prominently in airports around the world. Sullivan (2016) summarized the impact 
of this ban of devices on Samsung’s Galaxy Note 7 crisis when he stated: 
The Samsung recall is a big one. It’s the first one I know of in which 
announcements were made at airport gates that the device would not be allowed on 
planes until they were powered down completely. All those public announcements 
were like negative ads, and they were heard by hundreds of people (para. 8).  
Consumer defiance. Once the first release of Galaxy Note 7 phones were 
determined dangerous, millions of customers had already purchased the device. This 
meant Samsung had to instruct millions of stakeholders how to participate in the recall 
and exchange the device for a replacement phone, containing a battery from a new 
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supplier, that was deemed safe. Following the first recall, the newly replaced “safe” 
devices were determined unsafe and the Galaxy Note 7 was pulled from the market. 
Samsung faced an even more challenging and risky quandary. 
In order to end the crisis, Samsung ceased production of the Galaxy Note 7s and 
attempted to remove all devices from the market. However, to do this Samsung was 
dependent on the millions of Galaxy Note 7 consumers’ participation. Organizational 
documents demonstrated that while many consumers willingly participated in order to rid 
themselves of the unsafe device, Samsung struggled with the remaining 10% or so. 10% 
of unreturned Galaxy Note 7s was not a small number considering the millions of people 
who originally purchased the phone. Perhaps the remaining 10% who did not participate 
did so out of lack of information, unclear as to how to exchange their device for a 
different phone, or they simply did not care to take Samsung’s suggestion to return the 
phone. Samsung was seemingly unsure as to why consumers were not responding when 
the brand stated “For those not heeding [the] advice or are still not aware of the recall 
notice, a software update will be pushed to all recalled devices” (Samsung, 2016e, para. 
4). More important for supply chain crisis communication research than the reasoning 
behind consumers not returning their device, is the cautionary lesson of how out of 
control Samsung was during the Galaxy Note 7 crisis as the organization had to plead 
with consumers to return devices. The time and money invested in the steps that had to be 
taken to end the crisis outlined below, and the impact of this lack of control on 
organizational reputation is important to note. 
As of December, 9, 2016 almost two full months after Samsung’s October 10, 2016 
notice of a global recall for all Galaxy Note 7 devices, Samsung was still missing 7% of 
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the phones (Samsung, 2016L). By then, multiple software updates had already been 
issued to encourage returns of the dangerous devices. These updates began after the first 
recall and included the green battery icon to indicate a safe device (Samsung, 2016e) and 
a safety notice “that [urged] owners to power down and exchange their recalled device” 
each time the phone was turned on and off (Samsung, 2016e, para. 4). After the devices 
were pulled off the market and Samsung was still struggling to reach 100% return, 
Samsung implemented a software update, released on December 30, that prevented 
Galaxy Note 7 devices from charging so that once the phone lost power, it was no longer 
able to be used (Samsung, 2016L). 
Samsung was forced to invest time and money to create and implement software 
updates to make their phones inoperable to encourage consumers to return the dangerous 
devices. Samsung was placed in a position of complete lack of control as consumers who 
would not return the device of their own free will put the organization at risk of having to 
answer for another exploding device. Consumers not returning devices kept the crisis 
alive. Samsung had to continue to address the missing dangerous devices in 
organizational statements in order to encourage consumers to return them, reminding 
stakeholders of the exploding devices linked to Samsung’s brand. 
Chapter Five: Conclusions 
This paper used case study analysis to explore crisis response strategies and 
attributions of responsibility in a supply chain crisis. Organizational documents and 
media reports from Samsung’s Galaxy Note 7 crisis were collected and analyzed to better 
understand the unique communication challenges a supply chain crisis poses for an 
organization.  
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RQ1 (What communication strategies does the organization use during the supply 
chain crisis to communicate with publics?) found that Samsung used all SCCT crisis 
response strategies and did not cater crisis response strategies to the stakeholder 
perspective. RQ2 (What are the stakeholder attributions of responsibility during the 
supply chain crisis as seen through media reports?) and RQ3 (What are the organization’s 
attributions of responsibility during the supply chain crisis as seen through organizational 
documents?) found a dissonance between the attributions of responsibility that could 
inform Samsung’s variety of crisis response strategy choices. 
Thus, Samsung did not follow the guidelines presented by SCCT since their crisis 
response strategies did not align with their stakeholder attributions of crisis responsibility. 
Coombs (2006) states “The more responsibility stakeholders attribute to the organization 
the more the crisis response strategy must seem to accept responsibility for the crisis” (p. 
248). With media reports demonstrating high levels of attribution of responsibility, the 
crisis response strategies chosen by the organization during the crisis with minimal 
acceptance of responsibility, deny and diminish, did not align with stakeholder 
expectations. Samsung also misused bolstering, placing it as a primary response strategy 
and using it throughout the crisis. Bolstering offers a “minimal opportunity to develop 
reputational assets” (Coombs, 2007, p. 172) and efforts could have been focused on 
primary crisis response strategies that aligned with attributions of responsibility, as 
opposed to bolstering, to repair reputational damage. 
RQ4 (What challenges did Samsung experience during the supply chain crisis and 
resulting recall as evidenced by the organizational documents and media reports?) 
uncovered a variety of themes present during Samsung’s crisis related to supply chain 
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challenges as well as communication challenges. As experienced as Samsung was with 
managing a supply chain, the complexity of the global supply chain, risks of shared 
suppliers, and industry pressures all contributed to the crisis. Meanwhile communication 
challenges including a lack of transparency, ambiguous language, and mixed messages 
contributed to the “unsafe” reputation and continued consumer defiance. 
The complexity of suppliers challenged Samsung’s transparency as the 
organization had to track down the fault in the supply chain while answering for the 
overheating and exploding devices to the public. Once the phones began exploding and 
had to be globally recalled, the stakeholders expanded to include government agencies, 
retailers/distributors, and consumers on top of Samsung and its suppliers, which further 
complicated communication and transparency. 
Findings in this paper introduce challenges to traditional crisis response strategies 
that do not account for dissonance between perceived and actual responsibility when 
responding to supply chain crises. Challenges to traditional notions of reputation are also 
introduced. While theorizations of reputation originally relied on the organization’s own 
actions (Coombs, 2006; Coombs & Holladay, 2002; Fombrun & van Riel, 2003; Newsom 
et al., 2012), researchers such as Barnett and Hoffman (2008) and Veil et al. (2016) 
began to expand the traditional notion of the organization being the only impacting factor 
on its reputation. This paper further expands on this idea to include supply chain 
members as affecting organizational reputation. Samsung’s Galaxy Note 7 crisis 
demonstrates that stakeholders will still hold the organization responsible if the end 
product is faulty, even if it was the fault of a link in the supply chain. Supply chain 
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members, thus, impact reputation and must be considered as part of the organizational 
reputation. 
Theoretical Implications 
If Samsung had oriented themselves toward stakeholder perceptions, particularly 
regarding attribution of responsibility, more appropriate crisis response strategies could 
have been chosen. Samsung seemed disconnected in their organizational messages to 
stakeholders based on media reports. Crisis scholars should caution organizations against 
not attributing responsibility during a supply chain crisis. Coombs (2007) states 
“Responsibility requires accountability and the organization must answer for its actions” 
(p. 170). Samsung did not attribute responsibility in organizational documents and 
seemingly did not answer for its actions. Media reports reflected frustration toward the 
brand for not communicating clearly and not answering for the crisis at hand. In a supply 
chain crisis, where actual and perceived levels of control and responsibility are more 
skewed than traditional crises, organizations could benefit from a stakeholder oriented 
perspective to attune to public perceptions of responsibility. 
Another implication is for reputation management research. Suppliers have an 
impact on the reputation of an organization and the potential to negatively impact an 
organization’s reputation when a supply chain crisis occurs. This study demonstrates that 
despite the level of control over an actual at-fault entity within the supply chain, the end 
producer is always held responsible. While Samsung did not identify the suppliers at fault 
in organizational documents, the media reports did. And yet, only Samsung was held 
responsible for the crisis. Thus, this study suggests the reputational damage from a supply 
chain crisis will fall on the end producer. 
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Finally, research postulating the necessity of aligning crisis response strategies 
with attributions of responsibility in order to benefit an organization during a crisis were 
supported (Coombs, 1995; Coombs, 2006; Coombs, 2007; Coombs & Holladay, 2002; 
Coombs & Holladay, 2006). Samsung’s attributions of responsibility and stakeholder 
attributions of responsibility did not align and, as demonstrated in media reports, did not 
improve organizational reputation. The “protective powers” that Coombs (2007) states 
the correct crisis response strategy can offer for an organization’s reputation during a 
crisis, were not received by Samsung as the misaligned strategies used by the 
organization did not communicate an acceptance of appropriate responsibility to 
stakeholders. 
Practical Implications 
This study demonstrates the need for closer examination of supply chain network 
challenges and supply chain crises. As The Wall Street Journal aptly stated, Samsung’s 
supply chain crisis placed “a spotlight on supply-chain oversight and raising questions 
about the ability of today’s technology and management tools to help companies maintain 
quality control in giant complex networks of suppliers” (Loten & Norton, 2016, para. 1). 
Even Samsung, a noted expert in supply chain management, faced multiple breaks in 
their supply chain and a severe supply chain crisis. As use of supply chains increases, 
supply chain managers should remain cognizant of the risks inherent to supply chain 
reliance. Organizations must further examine complexities of supply chain management 
and supply chain crisis management to most effectively manage supply chains and 
prepare for potential crises. 
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Another practical implication for crisis managers and organizations with a supply 
chain is to understand that reliance on a supply chain lessens organizational control. The 
more complex the supply chain, the more difficult supply chain management of 
individual suppliers and the supply chain as a whole becomes. For Samsung, control was 
originally decreased by their reliance on a global supply chain, further decreased as 
multiple outer organizations became involved in the recall, and reached an all-time low 
once the brand was reliant on all consumers returning Galaxy Note 7 devices in order to 
end the crisis. 
This study also poses the question of how transparent organizations should be 
regarding their supply chain. Organizations could be more transparent about both supply 
chain reliance and the suppliers within the chain. With greater transparency of suppliers 
and supply chain reliance, stakeholders could have a greater awareness regarding supply 
chain complexities. If awareness is increased, in the event of a crisis, the break in the 
supply chain could be identified and more easily understood by stakeholders to be the at-
fault party, as opposed to holding the organization solely responsible. 
Finally, while management researchers delve into the fields of supply chain 
management and risk management to best serve the unique needs of supply chains, so too 
should communication researchers. As internal measures are implemented to prevent and 
alleviate supply chain risks, external measures such as employing supply chain crisis 
managers, trained specifically to address the unique risks of supply chain crises, should 
be implemented as well. 
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Limitations and Future Research 
This study was conducted as an exploratory study to begin the process of supply 
chain crisis research through examination of one supply chain crisis. Samsung’s Galaxy 
Note 7 crisis was chosen for its recency, newsworthiness, and unique instance of having 
two separate supplier failures in the same crisis. Future research should examine a range 
of supply chain crises to explore potential differences in crisis response and management 
based on factors such as industry, severity, location, etc. 
The data collected in this research focuses on external communication through 
examination of organizational documents and media reports. While these documents 
offer insight into both organizational handlings and media perceptions, future research 
could delve into the internal communications of an organization facing a supply chain 
crisis to offer insight as to why certain response strategies are chosen. For example, 
interviews with communication directors at organizations that have experienced a supply 
chain crisis could offer more rich data regarding supply chain crisis management than 
organizational documents alone can show. Future research could also delve more 
thoroughly into stakeholder perceptions through social media analysis. 
In conclusion, this thesis contributes to the crisis communication research 
literature by introducing a previously unstudied type of crisis, a supply chain crisis. 
Organizations are increasingly relying on supply chains (Natarajarathinam et al., 2009) 
and thus demand further research into the unique elements of this type of crisis. This 
study found that the complexity inherent to supply chain crises brings into question 
shared accountability and its impact on organizational responsibility, control, reputation 
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and response during a crisis. Future studies should delve further into this type of crisis to 
examine appropriate communication strategies when answering for a supply chain crisis. 
56 
Appendix A: Media Reports and Organizational Documents 
Media and 
Documents 
 Baig, E. C., & Swartz, J. (2016, October 10). Samsung, CPSC: Turn off
your Galaxy Note 7 now. USA Today. Retrieved from
https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/columnist/baig/2016/10/10/turn-
off-your-galaxy-note-7-right-now-cpsc-says/91874652/
 Brody, A. (2016, November 1). Samsung’s Galaxy Note 7 recall:
Lessons for procurement and supply chain teams. Supply Chain 247.
Retrieved from http://bravosolution.us/blog/samsungs-galaxy-note-7-
recall-lessons-procurement-supply-chain-teams/
 Chen, B. X., & Sang-Hun, C. (2016, October 11). Why Samsung
abandoned its Galaxy Note 7 flagship phone. The New York Times.
Retrieved from
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/12/business/international/samsung-
galaxy-note7-terminated.html
 Cheng, J., & Jeong, E. (2016, October 7). Samsung shareholders shrug
off Galaxy Note 7 smartphone recall. The Wall Street Journal.
Retrieved from https://www.wsj.com/articles/samsung-shareholders-
shrug-off-galaxy-note-7-smartphone-recall-1475827670
 Cheng, J., & McKinnon, J. D. (2016, October 23). The fatal mistake
that doomed Samsung’s Galaxy Note. The Wall Street Journal.
Retrieved from https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-fatal-mistake-that-
doomed-samsungs-galaxy-note-1477248978
 Cheng, R., & Tibken, S. (2017, March 28). As Galaxy S8 launches, did
Note 7 blowup change anything? CNET. Retrieved from
https://www.cnet.com/news/galaxy-s8-launch-note-7-note-8-battery-
blowup-what-change/
 Choudhury, S. R. (2016, September 28). Here’s why Samsung Galaxy
Note 7 recall will have a temporary impact on earnings. CNBC.
Retrieved from https://www.cnbc.com/2016/09/28/samsung-news-
galaxy-note-7-recall-expected-to-have-temporary-impact-on-
earnings.html
 Dolcourt, J. (2017, January 22). Samsung Galaxy Note 7 recall: Here’s
what happens now. CNET. https://www.cnet.com/news/samsung-
galaxy-note-7-return-exchange-faq/
 Eom, Y. (n.d.) An open letter to all Galaxy Note7 customers. Samsung.
Retrieved from
http://www.samsung.com/uk/note7exchange/customernotice/openletter/
 Hollister, S. (2016, October 10). Here’s why Samsung Note 7 phones
are catching fire. CNET. Retrieved from
https://www.cnet.com/news/why-is-samsung-galaxy-note-7-exploding-
overheating/
 How Samsung has tried to minimize damage after the Galaxy Note 7
recall (2016, October 6). Fortune. Retrieved from
http://fortune.com/2016/10/06/samsung-smartphone-recall-damage/
57 
 How Samsung tripped on quality control in its rush to beat Apple.
(2016, September 6). Fortune. Retrieved from
http://fortune.com/2016/09/06/samsung-apple-galaxy-note-quality/
 Fowler, G. A., & Stern, J. (2016, October 6). What Samsung must do to
win back our trust. The Wall Street Journal. Retrieved from
https://www.wsj.com/articles/what-samsung-must-do-to-win-back-our-
trust-1476218021
 Jacobs, J. (2016, October 14). Samsung sacrificed the Note 7 to save
the company. TIME. Retrieved from
http://time.com/4531372/samsung-note-7-recall-fires-overheating-why/
 Jansen, B. (2016, October 14). Samsung Galaxy Note 7 banned on all
U.S. flights due to fire hazard. USA Today. Retrieved from
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2016/10/14/dot-bans-samsung-
galaxy-note-7-flights/92066322/
 Kang, C. (2016, September 9). Galaxy Note 7 owners are urged to stop
using their phones. The New York Times. Retrieved from
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/10/technology/samsung-galaxy-
consumer-product-safety.html
 Kharpal, A. (2016, October 18). Samsung should have been clearer
during the Note 7 crisis but it won’t stay down for long. CNBC.
Retrieved from https://www.cnbc.com/2016/10/18/samsung-should-
have-been-clearer-during-the-note-7-crisis-but-it-wont-stay-down-for-
long.html
 Kharpal, A. (2017, February 26). Protestors storm Samsung press
conference building over Note 7 disposal issue. CNBC. Retrieved from
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/02/26/protestors-storm-samsung-press-
conference-building-over-note-7-disposal-issue.html
 Kwaak, J. S. (2017, March 28). Samsung may bring back its fire-
plagued Galaxy Note 7. CNET. Retrieved from
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/28/business/samsung-galaxy-note-
7-refurbished.html
 Lee, S. Y. (2017, January 15). Samsung Electronics probe finds battery
was main cause of Note 7 fires: source. Reuters. Retrieved from
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-samsung-elec-
smartphones/samsung-electronics-probe-finds-battery-was-main-cause-
of-note-7-fires-source-idUSKBN150019
 Lee, J. (2017, September 11). Samsung says Galaxy Note 8 pre-orders
highest among Note series. Reuters. Retrieved from
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-samsung-elec-smartphone/samsung-
says-galaxy-note-8-pre-orders-highest-among-note-series-
idUSKCN1BN050
 Lopez, E. (2017, January 23). Samsung reveals cause of Galaxy Note7
defects, unveils new quality control checklist. Supply Chain Dive.
Retrieved from https://www.supplychaindive.com/news/Samsung-
supplier-Galaxy-Note7-recall-quality-report/434496/
58 
 Lopez, E. & McKevitt, J. (2017, January 9). Samsung weathered the
Galaxy Note 7 recall by ramping up production downstream. Supply
Chain Dive. Retrieved from
https://www.supplychaindive.com/news/samsung-components-recall-
galaxy-note-7-supply-chain/433567/
 Loten, A., Castellanos, S., & Norton, S. (2016, October 11). Samsung
recall puts supply-chain oversight in spotlight. The Wall Street Journal.
Retrieved from https://www.wsj.com/articles/samsung-recall-puts-
supply-chain-oversight-in-spotlight-1476224149
 Martin, T. W., & McKinnon, J. D. (2017, January 20). Samsung
investigation blames battery size for Galaxy Note 7 fires. The Wall
Street Journal. Retrieved from https://www.wsj.com/articles/samsung-
investigation-blames-battery-size-for-galaxy-note-7-fires-1484906193
 Martin, T. W., & Jeong, E. (2017, January 22). Samsung blames
Galaxy Note 7 overheating on problems at suppliers. The Wall Street
Journal. Retrieved from https://www.wsj.com/articles/samsung-
blames-galaxy-note-7-overheating-on-problems-at-suppliers-
1485136013 
 McGregor, J. (2016, September 28). Samsung’s Galaxy Note 7 is
finished. Forbes. Retrieved from
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jaymcgregor/2016/09/28/samsungs-
exploding-battery-problem-will-finish-the-note-7/#2b07bcc01f3a
 Moynihan, T. (2017, January 22). Samsung finally reveals why the
Note 7 kept exploding. Wired. Retrieved from
https://www.wired.com/2017/01/why-the-samsung-galaxy-note-7-kept-
exploding/
 Mozur, P. (2016, October 27). Samsung’s Galaxy Note 7 debacle wipes
out its mobile profit. The New York Times. Retrieved from
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/28/business/samsung-galaxy-note-
7-profit.html
 Mozur, P., & Lee, S. (2016, September 2). Samsung to recall 2.5
million Galaxy Note 7s over battery fires. The New York Times.
Retrieved from
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/03/business/samsung-galaxy-note-
battery.html
 Ng, A. (2017, August 23). If you had a Galaxy Note 7, Samsung has a
discount for you. CNET. Retrieved from
https://www.cnet.com/news/galaxy-note-8-samsung-discount-trade-in/
 Oremus, W. (2016, October 11). How Samsung’s exploding-battery
fiasco will change the smartphone industry. Slate. Retrieved from
http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/2016/10/11/how_the_samsung_
galaxy_note_7_s_exploding_batteries_will_change_the_smartphone.ht
ml
 Page, C. (2016, September 12). Samsung to ‘remotely deactivate’ Note
7 handsets after six-year-old injured. The Inquirer. Retrieved from
59 
https://www.theinquirer.net/inquirer/news/2470429/samsung-to-
remotely-deactivate-galaxy-note-7-handsets-after-six-year-old-injured 
 Pak, N., & Young, S. (2016, October 12). Timeline: Samsung
electronics’ Galaxy Note 7 recall crisis. Reuters. Retrieved from
https://www.reuters.com/article/samsung-elec-smartphones/timeline-
samsung-electronics-galaxy-note-7-recall-crisis-idUSL4N1CG1KB
 Premack, R. (2017, October 5). Samsung is having an awesome 2017-
Despite its Note 7 and bribery scandals. Forbes. Retrieved from
https://www.forbes.com/sites/rachelpremack/2017/10/05/despite-its-
note-7-and-bribery-scandals-samsung-is-somehow-having-an-
awesome-2017/#17cc0a04aa50
 Samsung. (2016, August 2). Samsung unveils the new Galaxy Note 7:
The smartphone that thinks big. [Press Release]. Retrieved from
https://news.samsung.com/us/samsung-unveils-galaxy-note7-the-
intelligent-smartphone-unpacked-2016/
 Samsung. (2016, August 19). With the launch of Galaxy Note7,
Samsung empowers users to do more. [Press Release]. Retrieved from
https://news.samsung.com/us/launch-galaxy-note7-samsung-
empowers-users-gear-vr-gear-360-gear-iconx-level-active-connect-
auto/
 Samsung. (2016, September 2). Samsung establishes U.S. product
exchange program for Galaxy Note7. [Press Release]. Retrieved from
https://news.samsung.com/us/samsung-establishes-u-s-product-
exchange-program-galaxy-note7/
 Samsung. (2016, September 9). Samsung addresses FAA statement and
reminds consumers about the Note7 product exchange program. [Press
Release]. Retrieved from https://news.samsung.com/us/samsung-
addresses-faa-statement-reminds-consumers-note-7-product-exchange-
program/
 Samsung. (2016, September 15). Samsung announces US availability of
replacement Note7 devices as part of voluntary recall. [Press Release].
Retrieved from https://news.samsung.com/us/samsung-announces-us-
availability-of-replacement-note7-devices-as-part-of-voluntary-recall-2/
 Samsung. (2016, September 20). Samsung Galaxy Note7 US voluntary
recall update. [Press Release]. Retrieved from
https://news.samsung.com/us/samsung-galaxy-note7-us-voluntary-
recall-update-firmware-update-green-battery-icon/
 Samsung. (2016, September 22). About half of recalled Galaxy Note7
phones already exchanged. [Press Release]. Retrieved from
https://news.samsung.com/us/official-statement-about-half-of-recalled-
galaxy-note7-phones-already-exchanged/
 Samsung. (2016, October 7). Samsung statement on replacement Note7
devices. [Press Release]. Retrieved from
https://news.samsung.com/us/samsung-official-statement-on-
replacement-note7-devices/
60 
 Samsung. (2016, October 10). Samsung will ask all partners to stop
sales and exchanges of Galaxy Note7 while further investigation takes
place. [Press Release]. Retrieved from
https://news.samsung.com/us/official-statement-global-stop-sale-and-
exchange-of-galaxy-note7/
 Samsung. (2016, October 12). Samsung Electronics announces revised
earnings guidance for Q3 2016. [Press Release]. Retrieved from
https://news.samsung.com/us/samsung-electronics-announces-earnings-
guidance-3q-2016/
 Samsung. (2016, October 13). Samsung expands recall of Galaxy
Note7 devices to include original and replacement devices. [Press
Release]. Retrieved from https://news.samsung.com/us/samsung-
expands-recall-of-galaxy-note7-devices-to-include-original-and-
replacement-devices-company-offers-refund-and-exchange-program/
 Samsung. (2016, December 9). Samsung taking bold steps to increase
Galaxy Note7 device returns. [Press Release]. Retrieved from
https://news.samsung.com/us/samsung-taking-bold-steps-to-increase-
galaxy-note7-device-returns/
 Samsung. (2017, January 10). FAA lifts airline notification on Galaxy
Note7. [Press Release]. Retrieved from
https://news.samsung.com/us/faa-lifts-airline-notification-on-galaxy-
note7/
 Samsung. (2017, January 22). [Video] Galaxy Note7: Why it happened.
Samsung. Retrieved from https://news.samsung.com/us/video-galaxy-
note7-happened/
 Samsung. (2017, January 22). [Infographic]. Galaxy Note7: 8-point
battery check and multi-layer safety measures. Samsung. Retrieved
from https://news.samsung.com/us/infographic-galaxy-note7-8-point-
battery-check-multi-layer-safety-measures/
 Samsung. (2017, January 23). Samsung announces cause of Galaxy
Note7 incidents in press conference. [Press Release]. Retrieved from
https://news.samsung.com/us/Samsung-Electronics-Announces-Cause-
of-Galaxy-Note7-Incidents-in-Press-Conference
 Samsung. (2017, March 27). Samsung to set the principles to recycle of
returned Galaxy Note7 devices in an environmentally friendly way.
[Press Release]. Retrieved from
https://news.samsung.com/global/samsung-to-set-the-principles-to-
recycle-of-returned-galaxy-note-7-devices-in-an-environmentally-
friendly-way?CID=AFL-hq-mul-0813-11000279
 Samsung. (2017, August 2). A look at our process. [Press Release].
Retrieved from https://news.samsung.com/us/a-look-at-our-process-
quality-control/
 Samsung. (2017, August 23). Do bigger things with Samsung Galaxy
Note8, the next level note. [Press Release]. Retrieved from
https://news.samsung.com/us/samsung-galaxy-note8-do-bigger-things/
61 
 Samsung. (2017, September 8). Samsung sees its best note preorders
with the new Galaxy Note8. [Press Release]. Retrieved from
https://news.samsung.com/us/galaxy-note8-best-note-preorders/
 Samsung Galaxy Note 7 batteries reportedly catch fire (2016,
September 1). NBC. Retrieved from
https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/samsung-galaxy-note-7-
batteries-reportedly-catch-fire-n641066
 Samsung permanently stops Galaxy Note 7 production (2016, October
11). BBC News. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/news/business-
37618618 
 Sang-Hun, C. (2016, October 22). Galaxy Note 7 recall dismays South
Korea, the ‘republic of Samsung’. The New York Times. Retrieved from
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/23/world/asia/galaxy-note-7-recall-
south-korea-samsung.html
 Sang-Hun, C., & Mozur, P. (2017, January 23). Samsung Galaxy Note
7 crisis signals problems at Korea Inc. The New York Times. Retrieved
from https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/23/business/samsung-galaxy-
note7-fires.html
 Selyukh, A. (2016, September 14). The troubled Galaxy Note 7 leaves
some Samsung customers frustrated. National Public Radio. Retrieved
from
https://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2016/09/14/493916062/
the-troubled-galaxy-note-7-leaves-some-samsung-customers-frustrated
 Selyukh, A. (2016, October 14). Samsung Galaxy Note 7 banned on
planes, including in checked bags. National Public Radio. Retrieved
from https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/2016/10/14/497999029/samsung-galaxy-note-7-banned-on-planes-
including-in-checked-bags
 Spence, E. (2016, September 21). Samsung’s billion dollar headache
over the Galaxy Note 7. Forbes. Retrieved from
https://www.forbes.com/sites/ewanspence/2016/09/21/samsung-pain-
galaxy-note-7-cost/#2867ac5a4aa4
 Spence, E. (2016, November 7). Samsung Galaxy Note 7 has left the
United States. Forbes. Retrieved from
https://www.forbes.com/sites/ewanspence/2016/11/07/samsung-galaxy-
note-7-recall-success/#59ac67755bec
 Spieler, G. (2016, September 15). Samsung battery supplier also
distributes to other smartphones. Supply Chain Dive. Retrieved from
https://www.supplychaindive.com/news/Samsung-battery-smartphone-
visibility/426414/
 Statt, N. (2016, November 7). Samsung runs full-page apology ads over
Galaxy Note 7 recall. The Verge. Retrieved from
https://www.theverge.com/2016/11/7/13558442/samsung-galaxy-note-
7-recall-apology-ad
 Sullivan, M. (2016, October 12). How did Samsung botch the Galaxy
Note 7 crisis? It’s a failure of leadership. Fast Company. Retrieved
62 
from https://www.fastcompany.com/3064569/how-did-samsung-botch-
the-galaxy-note-7-crisis-its-a-failure-of-leadership 
 Swartz, J. (2016, September 15). Samsung recalls 1M Samsung Galaxy
Note 7 phones. USA Today. Retrieved from
https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2016/09/15/samsung-
recalls-1m-note-7-phones/90427540/
 Tsang, A. (2017, July 7). Samsung, seeking to move past scandals,
forecasts record profit. The New York Times. Retrieved from
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/07/business/samsung-profit-
earnings.html
 Tsukayama, H. (2017, January 22). Samsung cites two separate battery
issues for its Note 7 recall woes. The Washington Post. Retrieved from
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
switch/wp/2017/01/22/samsung-cites-two-separate-battery-issues-for-
its-note-7-recall-woes/?utm_term=.1dce9bcb65f2
 Tsukayama, H. (2017, February 27). After the Note 7 crisis, Samsung
won’t debut its next phone until March. The Washington Post.
Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
switch/wp/2017/02/27/after-the-note-7-crisis-samsung-wont-debut-its-
next-phone-until-march/?utm_term=.944a67025d37
 Wee, S. (2016, October 18). Samsung’s uneven handling of Galaxy
Note 7 fires angers Chinese. The New York Times. Retrieved from
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/19/business/samsung-galaxy-note7-
china-test.html
 Welch, C. (2016, October 12). Samsung will ‘dispose of’ recalled Note
7 phones, won’t repair or refurbish them. The Verge. Retrieved from
https://www.theverge.com/circuitbreaker/2016/10/12/13257504/samsu
ng-galaxy-note-7-disposal
 Wilhelm, P. (2017, September 12). Galaxy Note 8 preorders soar past
Note 7, new numbers show. Tech Radar. Retrieved from
https://www.techradar.com/news/heres-how-many-galaxy-note-8-
preorders-there-have-been-so-far
63 
References 
Alpaslan, C., Green, S., & Mitroff, I. (2009). Corporate governance in the context of 
crises: Towards a stakeholder theory of crisis management. Journal of 
Contingencies and Crisis Management, 17(1), 38-49. 
Andrews, J. (2012, April 16). 2009 peanut butter outbreak: Three years on, still no 
resolution for some. Food Safety News. Retrieved from 
http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2012/04/2009- peanut-butter-outbreak-three-
years-on-still-no-resolution-for-some/#.WbgNysiGOUk 
Barnett, M. L., & Hoffman, A. J. (2008). Beyond corporate reputation: Managing 
reputational interdependence. Corporate Reputation Review, 11(1), 1-9. 
Barry, J. (2004). Supply chain risk in an uncertain global supply chain environment. 
International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management, 34(9), 
695-697. 
Blackhurst, J., & Wu, T. (2009). Book introduction. In T. Wu & J. Blackhurst 
(Eds.), Managing supply chain risk and vulnerability tools and methods for 
supply chain decision makers. New York, New York: Springer. 
Braun, V., & Clark, V. (2006). Using thematic analysis in psychology. Qualitative 
Research in Psychology, 3(2), p. 77-101. 
Brody, A. (2016, November 1). Samsung’s Galaxy Note 7 recall: Lessons for 
procurement and supply chain teams. Supply Chain 247. Retrieved from 
http://bravosolution.us/blog/samsungs-galaxy-note-7-recall-lessons-procurement-
supply-chain-teams/ 
64 
 
Campi, J. P. (2103, February 1). Supply chain risk- your supplier’s supplier. Firestorm. 
Retrieved from https://www.firestorm.com/supply-chain-risk-your-supplier-s-
supplier/ 
Chapman, P., Christopher, M., Jüttner, U., Peck, H., & Wilding, R. (2002). Identifying 
and managing supply chain vulnerability. Logistics & Transport Focus, 4(4), 59-
70. 
Chapman, A. L., Hadfield, M., & Chapman, C. J. (2015). Qualitative research in 
healthcare: An introduction to grounded theory using thematic analysis. Journal 
of the Royal College of Physicians of Edinburgh, 45(3), 201-205. 
Chopra, S., & Meindl, P. (2004). Supply chain management: Strategy, planning and 
control. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson.  
Clarke, V. & Braun, V. (2014). Thematic analysis. In A. C. Michalos (Ed.), Encyclopedia 
of Quality of Life and Well-Being Research (p. 6626-6628). Dordecht, 
Netherlands: Springer. 
Coffelt, T. A., Smith, F. L., Sollitto, M., & Payne, A. R. (2010). Using sensemaking to 
understand victims’ responses to a natural disaster. Northwest Journal of 
Communiaction, 39(1), 11-35. 
Coombs, W. T. (1995). Choosing the right words: The development of guidelines for the 
selection of the “appropriate” crisis-response strategies. Management 
Communication Quarterly, 8(4), 447-476.  
Coombs, W. T. (1999). Information and compassion in crisis responses: A test of their 
effects. Journal of Public Relations Research, 11(2), 125-142. 
65 
Coombs, W. T. (2006). The protective powers of crisis response strategies: Managing 
reputational assets during a crisis. Journal of Promotion Management, 12(3/4), 
241-260. 
Coombs, W. T. (2007). Protecting organization reputations during a crisis: The 
development and application of situational crisis communication 
theory. Corporate Reputation Review, 10(3), 163-176. 
Coombs, W. T. (2009). Conceptualizing crisis communication. In R. L. Heath & H. D. 
O’Hair (Eds.) Handbook of Risk and Crisis Communication. 99-118. New York, 
NY: Routledge. 
Coombs, W. T. (2015). Ongoing crisis communication: Planning, managing, and 
responding: Fourth edition. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Coombs, W. T., & Holladay, S. J. (1996). Communication and attributions in a crisis: An 
experimental study in crisis communication. Journal of Public Relations 
Research, 8(4), 279-295. 
Coombs, W. T., & Holladay, S. J. (2002). Helping crisis managers protect reputational 
assets: Initial tests of the situational crisis communication theory. Management 
Communication Quarterly, 16(2), 165-168. 
Coombs, W. T., & Holladay, S. J. (2006). Unpacking the halo effect: Reputation and 
crisis management. Journal of Communication Management, 10(2), 123-137. 
Cooper, A. H. (2002). Media framing and social movement mobilization: German peace 
protest against INF missiles, the Gulf War, and NATO peace enforcement in 
Bosnia. European Journal of Political Research, 41(1), 37-80. 
66 
 
Creswell, J. W. (1998). Qualitative inquiry and research design: Choosing among five 
traditions. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.  
Dainton, M., & Zelley, E. D. (2015). Applying communication theory for professional 
life. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications.  
Davies, G., Chun, R., Da Silva, R. V., & Roper, S. (2003). Corporate reputation and 
competitiveness. New York, NY: Routledge.  
Dilenschneider, R. L. (2000). The corporate communications bible: Everything you need 
to know to become a public relations expert. Beverly Hills, CA: New Millennium 
Press. 
Dolcourt, J. (2017, April 16). Samsung Galaxy Note 7 recall: Here’s what happens now. 
CNET. Retrieved from https://www.cnet.com/news/samsung-galaxy-note-7-
return-exchange-faq/ 
Eisenberg, E. M. (1984). Ambiguity as strategy in organizational communication. 
Communication Monographs, 51(3), 227-242.  
Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989). Building theories from case study research. The Academy of 
Management Review, 14(4), 532-550. 
Faisal, M. N. (2009). Prioritization of risks in supply chains. In In T. Wu & J. Blackhurst 
(Eds.), Managing supply chain risk and vulnerability tools and methods for 
supply chain decision makers. New York, New York: Springer. 
Fisher, D. (2011, May 31). Japan disaster shakes up supply-chain strategies. Harvard 
Business School Working Knowledge. Retrieved from 
http://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/japan-disaster-shakes-up-supply-chain-strategies 
67 
Fombrun, C. J. & van Riel, C. B. M. (2003). Fame & fortune: How the world’s top 
companies develop winning reputations. New York, NY: Pearson Education. 
Freeman, R. E. (1984). Strategic management: A stakeholder approach. Boston, MA: 
Pitman. 
Freeman, R. E., & Gilbert, D. R. (1987). Managing stakeholder interests. In S. P. Sethi & 
C. M. Fable (Eds.), Business and society: Dimensions of conflict and cooperation 
(pp. 379-422). Lexington, MA: Lexington Books. 
Gaudenzi, B. & Borghesi, A. (2006) Managing risks in the supply chain using the AHP 
method. The International Journal of Logistics Management, 17(1), 114-136. 
Guest, G., MacQueen, K. M., & Namey, E. E. Introduction to applied thematic analysis. 
In G. Guest, K. M. MacQueen, & E. E. Namey (Eds.), Applied Thematic Analysis 
(p. 3-20). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Heath, R. L., & Millar, D. P. (2004). A rhetorical approach to crisis communication: 
Management, communication processes, and strategic responses. In D. P. Millar, 
& R. L. Heath (Eds.), Responding to crisis: A rhetorical approach to crisis 
communication (pp. 1-18). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Heider, F. (1958). The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations. New York: Wiley. 
Hittle, B., & Leonard, M. K. (2011). Decision making in advance of a supply chain 
crisis. Management Decision, 49(7), 1182-1193. 
Hyde, K. (2000). Recognising deductive processes in qualitative research. Qualitative 
Market Research, 3(2), 82-90. 
68 
Jones, T. M. (1995). Instrumental stakeholder theory: A synthesis of ethics and 
economics. Academy of Management Review, 20(2), 404-437. 
Kang, C. (2016, September 9). Galaxy Note 7 owners are urged to stop using their phones. 
The New York Times. Retrieved from 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/10/technology/samsung-galaxy-consumer-product-
safety.html 
Kirk, J., & Miller, M. L. (1986). Reliability and validity in qualitative research. Newbury 
Park, CA: SAGE Publications. 
Laplume, A., Sonpar, K., & Litz, R. (2008). Stakeholder theory: Reviewing a theory that 
moves us. Journal of Management, 34(6), 1152-1189. 
Lee, T. Y. S. (2008). Supply chain risk management. International Journal of Information 
and Decision Sciences, 1(1). 98-114. 
Lee, Y., & Lee, M. J. (2016, September 18). Rush to take advantage of a dull iPhone started 
Samsung’s battery crisis. Bloomberg Technology News. Retrieved from 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-09-18/samsung-crisis-began-in-
rush-to-capitalize-on-uninspiring-iphone 
Lee, S. Y., & Pak, N. (2016, October 10). Timeline- Samsung Electronics’ Galaxy Note 7 
recall crisis. Reuters. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/article/samsung-
elec-smartphones/timeline-samsung-electronics-galaxy-note-7-recall-crisis-
idUSL4N1CG1KB 
Lindlof, T. R., & Taylor, B. C. (2011). Qualitative communication research methods: 
Third edition. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications. 
69 
Littlejohn, S. W., Foss, A. K., & Oetzel, J. G. (2017). Theories of human communication: 
Eleventh Edition. Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press. 
Liu, Y. & Wang, S. (2011). Research on collaborative management in supply chain 
crisis. Procedia Environmental Sciences, 10, 141-146. 
Loten, A., & Norton, S. (2016, October 11). Samsung recall puts supply-chain oversight 
in spotlight. The Wall Street Journal. Retrieved from 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/samsung-recall-puts-supply-chain-oversight-in-
spotlight-1476224149 
Manuj, I., & Mentzer, J. T. (2008a). Global supply chain risk management 
strategies. International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics 
Management, 38(3), 192-223. 
Manuj, I., & Mentzer, J. T. (2008b). Global supply chain risk management. Journal of 
Business Logistics, 29(1), 133-135. 
Manuj & Sahin. (2011). A model of supply chain and supply chain decision making 
complexity. International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logisitics 
Management, 41(5), 511-549. 
Manusov, V. & Spitzberg, B. (2008). Attribution theory. In L. A. Baxter & D. O. 
Braithwaite (Eds.), Engaging theories in interpersonal communication: Multiple 
perspectives (pp. 37-51). Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications. 
Masullo, K. (2017, August 25). Harvey threatens significant business disruption. 
Firestorm. Retrieved from https://www.firestorm.com/harvey-threatens-
significant-business-disruption/ 
70 
McAuley, E., Duncan, T. E., & Russell, D. W. (1992). Measuring causal attributions: The 
revised causal dimension scale (CDSII). Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin, 18(5), 566-573. 
Milburn, T., Schuler, R., & Watman, K. (1983). Organizational crisis part II: Strategies 
and responses. Human Relations, 36, 1161-1180. 
Miller, B. M., & Horsley, J.S. (2009). Digging deeper: Crisis management in the coal 
industry. Journal of Applied Communication Research, 37(3), 298-316. 
Mozur, P., & Lee, S. (2016, September 2). Samsung to recall 2.5 million Galaxy Note 7s 
over battery fires. The New York Times. Retrieved from 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/03/business/samsung-galaxy-note-battery.html 
Natarajarathinam, M., Capar, I., & Narayanan, A. (2009). Managing supply chains in 
times of crisis: a review of literature and insights. International Journal of Physical 
Distribution & Logistics Management, 39(7), 535-573. 
Newsom, D., Turk, J., & Kruckeberg, D. (2012). This is PR: The realities of public 
relations, eleventh edition. Boston, MA: Wadsworth. 
Norrman, A. & Jansson, U. (2004).  Ericsson's proactive supply chain risk management 
approach after a serious sub‐supplier accident. International Journal of Physical 
Distribution & Logistics Management, 34(5), 434-456. 
Oremus, W. (2016, October 11). How Samsung’s exploding-battery fiasco will change 
the smartphone industry. Slate. Retrieved from 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/2016/10/11/how_the_samsung_galaxy_note
_7_s_exploding_batteries_will_change_the_smartphone.html 
71 
Parke, A. (1993). Messy research, methodological predispositions, and theory 
development in international joint ventures. Academy of Management Review, 
18(2), 227-268. 
Pearson, C. M., & Clair, J. A. (1998). Reframing crisis management. Academy of 
Management Review, 23(1), 59-76. 
Powell, B. (2011, December 12). The global supply chain: So very fragile. Fortune. 
Retrieved from http://fortune.com/2011/12/12/the-global-supply-chain-so-very-
fragile/?iid=sr-link3 
Ritchie, B., & Brindley, C. (2009) Effective management of supply chains: Risks and 
performance. In T. Wu & J. Blackhurst (Eds.), Managing supply chain risk and 
vulnerability tools and methods for supply chain decision makers. New York, NY: 
Springer. 
Samsung. (2016a, September 2). Samsung establishes U.S. product exchange program 
for Galaxy Note7. [Press Release]. Retrieved from 
https://news.samsung.com/us/samsung-establishes-u-s-product-exchange-
program-galaxy-note7/ 
Samsung. (2016b, September 2). [Statement] Samsung will replace current Note7 with 
new one. [Press Release]. Retrieved from 
https://news.samsung.com/global/statement-on-galaxy-note7 
Samsung. (2016c, September 9). Samsung addresses FAA statement and reminds 
consumers about the Note7 product exchange program. [Press Release]. 
Retrieved from https://news.samsung.com/us/samsung-addresses-faa-statement-
reminds-consumers-note-7-product-exchange-program/ 
72 
Samsung. (2016d, September 15). Samsung announces US availability of replacement 
Note7 devices as part of voluntary recall. [Press Release]. Retrieved from 
https://news.samsung.com/us/samsung-announces-us-availability-of-replacement-
note7-devices-as-part-of-voluntary-recall-2/ 
Samsung. (2016e, September 20). Samsung Galaxy Note7 US voluntary recall update. 
[Press Release]. Retrieved from https://news.samsung.com/us/samsung-galaxy-
note7-us-voluntary-recall-update-firmware-update-green-battery-icon/ 
Samsung. (2016f, September 22). About half of recalled Galaxy Note7 phones already 
exchanged. [Press Release]. Retrieved from https://news.samsung.com/us/official-
statement-about-half-of-recalled-galaxy-note7-phones-already-exchanged/ 
Samsung. (2016g, October 7). Samsung statement on replacement Note7 devices. [Press 
Release]. Retrieved from https://news.samsung.com/us/samsung-official-
statement-on-replacement-note7-devices/ 
Samsung. (2016h, October 10). Samsung will ask all partners to stop sales and 
exchanges of Galaxy Note7 while further investigation takes place. [Press 
Release]. Retrieved from https://news.samsung.com/us/official-statement-global-
stop-sale-and-exchange-of-galaxy-note7/ 
Samsung. (2016i, October 12). Samsung Electronics announces revised earnings 
guidance for Q3 2016. [Press Release]. Retrieved from 
https://news.samsung.com/us/samsung-electronics-announces-earnings-guidance-
3q-2016/ 
Samsung. (2016j, October 13). Samsung expands recall of Galaxy Note7 devices to 
include original and replacement devices. [Press Release]. Retrieved from 
73 
https://news.samsung.com/us/samsung-expands-recall-of-galaxy-note7-devices-
to-include-original-and-replacement-devices-company-offers-refund-and-
exchange-program/ 
Samsung. (2016k, November 7). Samsung [Advertisement]. The Washington Post, A9. 
Samsung. (2016L, December 9). Samsung taking bold steps to increase Galaxy Note7 
device returns. [Press Release]. Retrieved from 
https://news.samsung.com/us/samsung-taking-bold-steps-to-increase-galaxy-
note7-device-returns/ 
Samsung. (2017a, January 10). FAA lifts airline notification on Galaxy Note7. [Press 
Release]. Retrieved from https://news.samsung.com/us/faa-lifts-airline-
notification-on-galaxy-note7/ 
Samsung. (2017b, January 22). [Video] Galaxy Note7: Why it happened. Samsung. 
Retrieved from https://news.samsung.com/us/video-galaxy-note7-happened/ 
Samsung. (2017c, January 22). [Infographic]. Galaxy Note7: 8-point battery check and 
multi-layer safety measures. Samsung. Retrieved from 
https://news.samsung.com/us/infographic-galaxy-note7-8-point-battery-check-
multi-layer-safety-measures/ 
Samsung. (2017d, January 22). Samsung announces cause of Galaxy Note7 incidents in 
press conference. [Press Release]. Retrieved from 
https://news.samsung.com/us/Samsung-Electronics-Announces-Cause-of-Galaxy-
Note7-Incidents-in-Press-Conference 
74 
Samsung Galaxy Note 7 batteries reportedly catch fire. (2016, September 1). NBC News. 
Retrieved from https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/samsung-galaxy-note-7-
batteries-reportedly-catch-fire-n641066 
Samsung permanently stops Galaxy Note 7 production. (2016, October 11). BBC News. 
Retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/news/business-37618618 
Sang-Hun, C. (2016, October 22). Galaxy Note 7 recall dismays South Korea, the 
“Republic of Samsung”. The New York Times. Retrieved from 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/23/world/asia/galaxy-note-7-recall-south-korea-
samsung.html 
Sang-Hun, C., & Mozur, P. (2017, January 23). Samsung Galaxy Note 7 crisis signals 
problems at Korea Inc. The New York Times. Retrieved from 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/23/business/samsung-galaxy-note7-fires.html 
Seeger, M.W., & Ulmer, R.R. (2001). Virtuous responses to organizational crisis: Aaron 
Feuerstein and Milt Cole. Journal of Business Ethics,31, 369–376. 
Selyukh, A. (2016, September 14). The troubled Galaxy Note 7 leaves some Samsung 
customers frustrated. National Public Radio. Retrieved from 
https://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2016/09/14/493916062/the-
troubled-galaxy-note-7-leaves-some-samsung-customers-frustrated 
Sinha, P. R., Whitman, L. E., & Malzahn, D. (2004). Methodology to mitigate supplier 
risk in an aerospace supply chain. Supply Chain Management: An International 
Journal, 9(2), 154-168. 
Sitkin, S. B., & Pablo, A. L. (1992). Reconceptualizing the determinants of risk 
behavior. Academy of Management Review, 17(1), 9-38. 
75 
Spence, E. (2016, September 20). The Note 7 nightmare that Samsung created. Forbes. 
Retrieved from https://www.forbes.com/sites/ewanspence/2016/09/20/samsung-
galaxy-note-7-battery-failure-danger/#7565fa687e2a 
Spieler, G. (2016, September 15). Samsung battery supplier also distributes to other 
smartphones. Supply Chain Dive. Retrieved from 
https://www.supplychaindive.com/news/Samsung-battery-smartphone-
visibility/426414/ 
Stock, J. R. & Boyer, S. L. (2009) Developing a consensus definition of supply chain 
management: A qualitative study. International Journal of Physical Distribution & 
Logistics Management, 39(8), 690-711. 
Stratton, P. (1997). Attributional coding of interview data: Meeting the needs of long-
haul passengers. In N. Hayes (Ed.), Doing qualitative analysis in psychology (pp. 
115-142). Hove, UK: Psychology Press. 
Sturges, D. (1994). Communicating through crisis. Management Communication 
Quarterly, 7(3), 297-316. 
Swartz, J. (2016, September 15). Samsung recalls 1M Samsung Galaxy Note 7 phones. 
USA Today. Retrieved from 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2016/09/15/samsung-recalls-1m-note-7-
phones/90427540/ 
Ulmer, R. R. (2001). Effective crisis management through established stakeholder 
relationships: Malden Mills as a case study. Management Communication 
Quarterly, 14(4), 590-615. 
76 
Ulmer, R. R., & Sellnow, T. L. (1997). Strategic ambiguity and the ethic of significant 
choice in the tobacco industry’s crisis communication. Communication Studies, 
48(3), 215-223. 
Veil, S. R., Dillingham, L. L., & Sloan, A. G. (2016) Fencing out the Jones’s: The 
development of response strategies for spillover crises. Corporate Reputation 
Review, 19(4), 316-330. 
Waymer, D., & Heath, R. L. (2007) Emergent agents: The forgotten publics in crisis 
communication and issues management research. Journal of Applied 
Communication Research, 35(1), 88-108. 
Winkleman, M. (1999). The right stuff. Chief Executive, 143, 80-81. 
Yin, R. K. (1981). The case study crisis: Some answers. Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 26(1), 48-65. 
Yin, R. K. (2002). Applications of case study research (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: 
Sage Publications. 
Zsidisin, G. A., & Ritchie, B. (2009) Supply chain risk management- developments, 
issues, and challenges. In G. A. Zsidisin & B. Ritchie (Eds), Supply chain risk: A 
handbook of assessment, management, and performance. New York, NY: Springer. 
Zuckerman, A. (2002). Supply chain management. Oxford, UK: Capstone Publishing. 
77 
Vita 
Kathleen L. Ambrose  
College of Communication and Information 
University of Kentucky 
Education 
B.A. Human Communication, University of Central Florida 
Orlando, FL (May 2015) 
Academic Employment  
University of Kentucky, College of Communication and Information, Lexington, KY 
2017-2018  Graduate Teaching Assistant, Department of Communication  
2016-2017   Graduate Teaching Assistant, Department of Communication  
Academic Awards and Honors 
2018 Finalist, “Big Jack” Award for Best Presentation and Paper, International 
Public Relations Research Conference  
2018 Nominee, Teaching Assistant of the Year, College of Communication and 
Information, University of Kentucky 
Professional Publications 
Ambrose, K., & Matusitz, J. (in press). Understanding Ebola in West Africa: Applying 
the human ecology theory. Global Social Welfare. 
Veil, S. R., & Ambrose, K. (under contract). Communicating in supply chain crises. In 
F. Frandsen & W. Johansen. (Eds.), Handbook of crisis communication. 
Berlin: De Gruyter Mouton. 
